Anyone reading the data dump from the NTSB last week for the Bradley B-17 crash?

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=100356&fbclid=IwAR1Zk-wGN17GpyRNakbG5d3g1JXT-n1DobxjmaYS3B_rwxzhvtimR-_17QM

A lot in there to digest, unfortunately.

Failings at every level from the FAA on down.  An accident that will have (positive, likeky) ripple effects throughout the warbird ride-giving community.

But, there are two things that stick out to me, among an entire ocean of topics to discuss:

One:  "the flight engineer on the flight, once he got -- he had left the cockpit and went back to the back to tell everybody they could get up and move around. And when he got back to the cockpit, Mac said, "We need to cage number 4," as in shut down number 4. And the flight engineer said, "I'm not ready yet." And the flight engineer in his conversation with us said, with that, Mac reached over and feathered the number 4 engine. Co-pilot had no input. Flight engineer had no input, no verification. And he just reached over there and shut it down."

Two: "On the FAA medical application dated December 28, 2012, it indicated 5,800 hours of total flight time with 200 hours in the past six months. One year later, on December 20, 2013 he reported 11,000 flight hours with 200 hours in the past six months. This was an increase in 5,200 flight hours in a one-year period."

 

An idiot and liar.

Bob Hoover would never have let that shit happen.

I doubt that most people understand that the hour report to the FAA on your medical is an official attestation of your experience.

ETA: also sounds like an 1990s Asian airline level of CRM.

Old guys doing things the old way. It bent metal and got people killed.

Are you really an "old guy" when you've only been flying multiengine airplanes for 20 years and falsely claimed a huge chunk of your experience?

I am going to read this all later. The statements from the passengers were interesting. Can I assume that if he had gotten to the airport threshold and just chopped the power they might have survived this. This was all preventable with better maintenance

In the original thread that was the impression I got. They were set up for a straight in to a crossing secondary runway when headed back to the field. Instead they entered the downwind to the primary runway.

Can someone who has read this summarize and explain the maintenance issues?

I’ve read it. I’m not sure I totally understand it but my take is that moisture was getting into the mags for various reasons and they rigged tubes to a few of them to blow nitrogen in and get rid of the moisture. The #4 mag you had to open up and shoot nitrogen in. I also read something about using safety wire to jerry rig a p wire in place somehow.  They also did not do any kind of run up prior to departure even after having the mag issues causing trouble starting the engines.  They would also occasionally let the engines idle for a bit to burn off excess moisture but did not do this either.

Thanks.

The water got into the magneto due to the safety wire repair on #4. There are pictures in the report.  The magneto also barely worked and was gounding out.  What compounded the problem was all of the plugs were worn and gaped to wide on both right side engines. The point gap was improper as well on all 4 magnetos on the right side.  The lobe inside of one of the magnetos was also worn.
       They did not check engines #1 and #2. If I was a betting man I bet both are suffering from the same neglect. 1 cylinder on 1 rt side engine also had broken rings so it made less power.  #3 showed signs of detonation in at least one cylinder.  If he had done engine run ups before the take off the engines would have failed to meet specs of a 100 rpm drop on 1 magneto and they should have fixed. It seems to fall all on the pilot who was also an A&P and appeared to be signing off on repairs.  As well as wanting to make the flight. There are stills from a video that looks like a security camera. It shows frame by frame of him hitting the rt. wing and crashing

Water and humidity had a minor factor if any in the crash. Neglect and lack of maintenance were major causes.

The power plant report shows one of the two #4 mags in the first 2 pictures

Thanks.

What's sad is that there are multiple substantial points outside of the actions in handling the emergency that would have prevented the incident.

But, yes, had the PIC just accepted the short landing, and not chosen to apparently attempt a 2-engine-on-same-side go-around while well below Vmc, there probably would not have been nearly the same number of fatalities.  But, that was just the last of the long chain of errors.

Good accident analysis video from my friend and former instructor Gunny Perdue.

I don't completely agree with his analysis of only #3 being the failed engine (there is evidence that #4 wasn't producing much power either), but otherwise solid IMHO.

Normalization of deviance on steroids. Plus pilots that should have been 709'd a long time ago.

I think that all depends on which lens you choose to look at things through.

If you compare how the Collings tour was operated compared to most warbird operators and operations of the 1990s and prior, it was not just par for the course, but probably better organized and safer.  Many people were doing it for a long time before the FAA imposed the LHFE and the 135-lite requirements on the industry.

If you're comparing it to most current-day non-warbird professional flying operations, it was well short of that standard.  And warbird ride operations have *never* been to that standard.  Even the ones who are doing it "right" (the CAF is the best alternative example) don't do everything to a 135 or 121 standard yet, either.

Come on, it wasn't even up to Part 91 commercial standards. And the radio transcript by itself tells the 709 story much less the in cockpit actions. Reminds me of the way Harrison Ford sounded on the radio during his last cock up. Minds were pretty far from tack sharp. And you want/need to be sharp as a tack to fly something of that complexity, that level of difficulty, irreplaceable, and visible. You don't fly it like they did  in the war.

#4 was feathered and not running # 3 was running but not making full power per the NTSB report. There is no report for #1 and #2 . I would really like to see those looked at.

That is a good one.   Juan Browne also has a couple good ones.

I am a retired AF flight engineer.    So I was particularly interested in the comments/duties of the FE.   From the sound of things the FE was acting as FE/Loadmaster to be able to handle the passengers as well.   That got me wondering the differences between WW2 B-17 missions and the importance/reliance of the FE for inflight duties.  The incident seems to have been compounded by having a completely unqualified(B-17) co-pilot sitting in the right seat.

I guess one of the passengers was a current C-130 Loadmaster.   Supposedly he was instrumental in getting people off the plane after impact.

I was able to get a flight in a B-17 in the mid 80's.  Air Force air crew thing at an airshow.   Some of us were in the B-17 and a few others on a B-25.   I was up in the cockpit for takeoff.   The crew consisted of a Delta airlines pilot who was the PIC.  He was younger, probably in late 40's/early 50s.  The co-pilot and FE were both ex B-17 WW2 era pilots and much older of course.   The FE had been a pow.  The FE seemed like he had some duties during the flight.

Either way seems like some very poor judgment going on in that community.

There's no requirement from the FAA for the right-seater to have an Experimental Type Rating to fly as SIC, even for ride operations.

There is such a thing as an SIC type rating, but all the bomber operators I know of have local/organizational checkout programs (some of which can be completed in as little as one flight) for their right-seaters.

IIRC, the right seater was being checked out on this flight too, wasn't he?   It does make  you wonder if having a more capable right seater could have helped in some of the decision making or at least in managing the situation a bit better.   Seems like if a couple things go a different way, this accident doesn't happen, but isn't that always the case.

Like - identifying and shutting down the correct engine, or flying straight in to the cross runway, which appears to potentially have been considered given the tight initial turn and lowering of the gear.   Both ended up costing them valuable airspeed that would have been vital to returning to the original runway.

No.  Foster was already qualified in the B-17 previous to the accident, and he actually had substantially more flight hours and professional flying experience than the accident PIC. If anything, Foster would have been (should have been) someone with professional CRM flight deck experience to offset the PIC's lack of it (as evidenced in his actions during the flight in question).

This is right from the interview with Rob Pinksten (the tour "Chief Pilot"):
And from the report summary:

And here were his FAA ratings:

So, not in any way a "completely unqualified" SIC.

Guess the co-pilots qualifications are different than I remember hearing about.  I had thought this was like his first flight in a -17.

Reading the witness statements it seems like the Foundation is gonna get sued out the ass for failure to properly secure the passengers and not briefing any safety measures whatsoever.

Also the interview with the loadmaster/Engineer makes it sound like he didn't really know what he was doing, a lot of just copying others actions.

Thanks for the added info.  I may have been confusing this with a different incident or perhaps mis-understood some of the commentary from the various videos.

Rob Pinksten is "Chief Pilot"? Holy hell in a handbasket. I remember this guy. I've met him. Weird dude. Seems like a good pilot. Family has been funding a dream shot aviation adventure for him. He was collecting ratings at a frightening rate.

So he's like a ripe 24 years old now. I see his ratings are in some sort of weird state:

Attached File


Looking at Google some more, he was "chief pilot" of their airshow troupe before he was age 20! Clearly daddy must have been making some big contributions to the Collings Foundation. That's just crazy. I'm sure he's a great guy and and a damn good pilot, but no one has the experience to be "chief pilot" of that sort of operation at those ages.

Just another example of how badly broken that operation is.

I agree that this was one of the many failures.

I think it is low-hanging fruit to place the blame on Pinky, though. He's a fine enough pilot based on my limited experience with him, and is experienced enough in all of the Collings airplanes to do the instructing and checking he was responsible for.

The failure was picking a guy with no organizational management experience to lead a complex organization.

It is painfully evident when reading Pinky's interview with the FAA and NTSB that he is sharp as a tack when it comes to the "small picture" piloting stuff; checkrides, qualifications, etc, he's right on it.  But once the questions start covering the administrative stuff -- especially the safety program/SMS -- he doesn't know the granular details and doesn't seem to care. But, again, he doesn't know what he doesn't know because he's has never (previously) had to lead a complex flying organization where those things are an important component of leading and managing.

The age-old thing about being a technician vs a leader...and Pinky is a hell of a technician. He was selected for a job he did not have the qualifications for and got thrown into the deep end. Everyone wants to be Chief Pilot until it is time to do Chief Pilot shit....and IMHO a stronger leader in that position could have had a different impact on the actions of a Director of Maintenance with a strong personality, and things like selecting pilots to be instructors who don't have CFIs, and establishing a safety culture with an emphasis on CRM.

All of that is monday-morning quarterbacking, of course.

The other thing that is somewhat un-said here is that all of these ride-givers rely on an enormous of volunteer-donated time and effort to work. Even people filling key positions are often unpaid, and it is challenging to find people with the combination of the right level of experience, the right attitude/personality, and the availability to go barnstorming every spring-through-fall.

There is pressure to have these airplanes out on the road and touring. I'm with a warbird organization that has touring aircraft that sell a ton of rides every year...but they're honest in saying that if the airplanes aren't able to sell rides, they're never going to fly again because it is just too expensive to do so. I have to assume that Collings is under similar internal pressures to keep the circus going, and the circus requires a lot of people.

There are plenty of highly qualified pilots out there who would love to do this stuff, but the list of people who are willing and able to take a lot of time out of their year to be unpaid and away from home is small. Often times the people who are available don't fit the other two desirables of being highly qualified and the right personality.  Sometimes you have to settle for two of the three.  Sometimes you even have to settle for one of the three (e.g. someone who is available and willing to go tour).

This is one of those areas I think that, if the FAA doesn't get rid of the LHFE and shut all the warbird ride operators down all together, this accident will have a positive outcome on the rest of the "industry". I know that the organization I'm part of is substantially raising the bar with respect to training and (especially) documentation of training, as well as a whole laundry list of other things.  Everyone is going to be the better for it.

I don't know if that is a revocation, a suspension or otherwise.  I also don't know if it is related at all to the 909 crash, but there likely *is* some relation to the parallel thing that is happening with the FAA and warbird operators with airplanes having a Limited Type Certificate (primarily the fighters), as Pinky was doing training in the Collings TF-51 and perhaps others.

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2020-08-14/warbird-trainer-fights-faa-emergency-order

Interesting reading, MudEagle. Thanks for the links. Could very well be his cert's are pending the sorting out of the training stuff. One would think you'd need an LOA or some kind of waiver, historical precedent not withstanding, but all that stuff is well outside of my lane!

The lawsuit will have a field day with more than that. The neglect of the right side engines and a non working seat belt that killed a passenger are easy wins for even a rookie lawyer.

That, not the FAA, is what will kill the warbird industry.

A teenager was the chief pilot of an organization flying paying passengers on ww2 aircraft with 4 radial engines and shit handling qualities that were maintained by volunteer mechanics?  Pilot attempts a 2 or 2.5 engine go around after dragging a wing on the ground?  Seat belts that don't work?  Engines that don't start unless you know the secret magneto instructions?  

Sounds like amateur hour at the clown show.  Also sounds like the organization is irreparably dysfunctional.  
Seems like the best possible outcome is they are sued out of existence and a responsible party buys whatever planes they have left.  

I hope for his own sake that CP is judgement proof, because there is enough gross negligence to potentially make him personally liable.

As they say, never invite the Man into your life.

I get the points MudEagle is making, but one thing adhering to FAA/CFR standards does is create the minimum level of due diligence so when the lawyers come a calling, there is some objective baseline. Otherwise, the diligence analysis can become “turtles all the way down” as any decision to actually operate an aircraft becomes at the Long Green Table or in the deposition room, a dangerous acceptance of deviance resulting in a crash.

Stuff like working seatbelts is that baseline, and increasingly stuff like SMS scoring, independent maintenance chains of command to a DO are that standard.

We definitely agree on this point.

There's a multi-axis simultaneous threat from attorneys on one side, the insurance companies on another, and the FAA on yet another. Ultimately that loop is likely to close if operators don't get their own crap together first. Unfortunately, there are a lot....a lot....of incidents that resulted in lives lost and which were entirely preventable over the history of warbird operations that have sadly led us to this point.

That being said, IMHO there is a stark difference in the overall attitude and tenor of the warbird world today compared to when I first started playing the game 15-ish years ago (and from what I know of the culture going all the way back to the 60s). There is a substantially higher interest in safe operations than there ever has been, and there is interestingly a lot of crossover with guys coming out of the 121 world and dragging things like SMS into the mix.

I think ME is spot on but I think the sword that chops the head off the warbird community will be wielded by an insurance salesman.

We are already seeing insanely high insurance premiums seriously choke a lot of the recreational warbird flying. It has already effectively killed the Unlimited class air racers at this point.

It is an interesting paradox; if you have an airplane that has value because of its rarity and desirability as a flyer, and it is essentially grounded because nobody will insure it...it is sort of the Schrodinger cat.  It is both too valuable to risk flying, but simultaneously worthless because the core of its value was its status as a rare, desirable, flyable aircraft that can no longer be flown.

Insurance is killing everyone. The commercial policy on helicopters has gone up 33% over the last two years. Too many high profile tour operators having high profile accidents (mostly HI and NYC). Two underwriters completely bailed from the aviation scene. It's become an insurance sellers market. At 100 hours per year insurance is now almost 50% of my direct operating costs. Too much more of this and I'll have to self-insure the hull (not liability) on my R44 because otherwise it'll simply become too expensive to fly.

Update from Juan and friend

Thanks for posting this.

Good update.   Cook to hear some of thier airline stories too.  Still sucks the plane was lost as well as the fatalities in what looks to be a series of bad decisions.