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Posted: 1/22/2021 12:05:56 PM EDT
[#1]
I'm no pilot but it seems crazy you couldn't tell what engine was out, left or right.
I see now this is a bus jet aircraft, so hard to look out the cockpit and see what the engines are doing. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 12:14:13 PM EDT
[#2]
Damn, so hard to believe.
 @aramp1 |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 12:38:51 PM EDT
[#3]
Quote HistoryQuoted: I'm no pilot but it seems crazy you couldn't tell what engine was out, left or right. I see now this is a bus jet aircraft, so hard to look out the cockpit and see what the engines are doing. You usually only have seconds to respond to an eng out in a multi engine before you’re in an unrecoverable situation. It’s not uncommon to pull the wrong engine offline, especially if they are both next to each other or at the tail or something. Usually the best bet is to look for the one with dropping oil pressure. It’s not like a single engine where if it fails you can just chillax and think things through. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 2:23:24 PM EDT
[#4]
Quote HistoryQuoted: You usually only have seconds to respond to an eng out in a multi engine before you’re in an unrecoverable situation. It’s not uncommon to pull the wrong engine offline, especially if they are both next to each other or at the tail or something. Usually the best bet is to look for the one with dropping oil pressure. It’s not like a single engine where if it fails you can just chillax and think things through. In a turbofan/turbojet aircraft though? I get the priority to feather/secure in a piston or turboprop, but figured you have a little more time with a turbofan/turbojet. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 2:49:49 PM EDT
[#5]
I was wondering about this incident a few week ago.
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Posted: 1/22/2021 2:59:54 PM EDT
[#6]
Quote HistoryQuoted:You usually only have seconds to respond to an eng out in a multi engine before you’re in an unrecoverable situation. It’s not uncommon to pull the wrong engine offline, especially if they are both next to each other or at the tail or something. Usually the best bet is to look for the one with dropping oil pressure. It’s not like a single engine where if it fails you can just chillax and think things through. Sure, there are plenty of aircraft that become a handful when they lose an engine on takeoff, and even some that can be an issue at altitude, but these tend to be piston powered aircraft, not a jet like this. Reading the report, it does appear that they had some very bad vibrations, but they were not losing altitude in any significant way, nor should they with one engine still running properly. It is easy to imagine with vibrations of the magnitude described in the report that the pilot(s) would want to do something Right Now, but unfortunately that pilot made the wrong decision. Here's a very interesting video that describes just how "non" such a non-event can be in a business jet. At least until you lose both engines! Of course these guys did not experience any dramatic shaking of the aircraft. But it is still a good discussion of the performance margins and handling qualities of a typical business jet with one engine inoperative (OEI).  ACTUAL DUAL ENGINE FAILURE IN A CITATION JET |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 4:22:51 PM EDT
[#7]
Quote HistoryQuoted: You usually only have seconds to respond to an eng out in a multi engine before you’re in an unrecoverable situation. It’s not uncommon to pull the wrong engine offline... Not just no, but fuck no. I’ve flown with copilots who think this is how it is but it’s not. Take your time to do things the right way, the airplane isn’t going to fall out of the sky. Even on a V1 cut it’s far more important to be smooth than fast. This accident seems like one hell of a tragic training failure. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 5:01:15 PM EDT
[#8]
I could maybe understand if it happened when they were rotating on takeoff with crap performance in a turboprop, but jumping the gun while at cruise in a jet in the stratosphere!?
That's pants on head crazy. FWIW, the Army has gotten away from "act immediately or you will die" training because there's been countless crashes over the years from wrong actions made in haste when there was rarely a need to act so quickly. I don't know anything about those jets..... I assume they have an apu and the starters are pneumatic? Why couldn't they get the engine started again? |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 5:57:46 PM EDT
[#9]
Do the engines on those have the same issues with a high altitude shut-down as those on Pinnacle 3701?
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Posted: 1/22/2021 7:20:52 PM EDT
[#10]
Quote HistoryQuoted: They were in a Bombardier BD-700, in cruise, at 43,000ft. In this type of aircraft, under those conditions, unless there is some sort of explosive type damage that compromises the handling characteristics of the aircraft, or a fire that can't be put out, losing an engine is almost a complete non-event. Sure, there are plenty of aircraft that become a handful when they lose an engine on takeoff, and even some that can be an issue at altitude, but these tend to be piston powered aircraft, not a jet like this. Reading the report, it does appear that they had some very bad vibrations, but they were not losing altitude in any significant way, nor should they with one engine still running properly. It is easy to imagine with vibrations of the magnitude described in the report that the pilot(s) would want to do something Right Now, but unfortunately that pilot made the wrong decision. Here's a very interesting video that describes just how "non" such a non-event can be in a business jet. At least until you lose both engines! Of course these guys did not experience any dramatic shaking of the aircraft. But it is still a good discussion of the performance margins and handling qualities of a typical business jet with one engine inoperative (OEI).  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKxgne1J2pUYeah, you’re right, I was thinking more about at takeoff or being outside of Vse, sorry. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 8:31:26 PM EDT
[#11]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Do the engines on those have the same issues with a high altitude shut-down as those on Pinnacle 3701? God no, the Global XRS uses BR710’s made by Rolls Royce. It’s the same engine used on the GV and will do 510. The Global is in now way similar to the CL65 other than fuselage diameter. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 8:32:36 PM EDT
[#12]
Quote HistoryQuoted: You usually only have seconds to respond to an eng out in a multi engine before you’re in an unrecoverable situation. It’s not uncommon to pull the wrong engine offline, especially if they are both next to each other or at the tail or something. Usually the best bet is to look for the one with dropping oil pressure. It’s not like a single engine where if it fails you can just chillax and think things through. Is this a serious post? |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 8:37:52 PM EDT
[#13]
Quote HistoryQuoted: You usually only have seconds to respond to an eng out in a multi engine before you’re in an unrecoverable situation. It’s not uncommon to pull the wrong engine offline, especially if they are both next to each other or at the tail or something. Usually the best bet is to look for the one with dropping oil pressure. It’s not like a single engine where if it fails you can just chillax and think things through. Not the case at all. Never had one close on the deck, as in V1 cut; but I have shutdown engines numerous times maybe in the hundreds of times, none event. Granted these were all controlled events. Even at Vse, unless you have no altitude left it should be a none event. Not arm chair quarter backing these guys at all, fog of war crap happens. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 8:39:21 PM EDT
[#14]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Is this a serious post? Quote HistoryQuoted: Quoted: You usually only have seconds to respond to an eng out in a multi engine before you’re in an unrecoverable situation. It’s not uncommon to pull the wrong engine offline, especially if they are both next to each other or at the tail or something. Usually the best bet is to look for the one with dropping oil pressure. It’s not like a single engine where if it fails you can just chillax and think things through. Is this a serious post? No, the stupid is very strong with JTRs posts. He couldn't be more completely wrong. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 9:52:53 PM EDT
[#15]
We'll never know what happened for sure, but Paul Voss probably had more hours in the E11 than any other pilot in the Air Force. Training a new guy...don't know if the new guy over-reacted. (He wasn't a new pilot, just new to the airframe) When I first heard back in Jan, I thought the cabin may have rapidly decompressed and they didn't get masks on in time. (We were required to have one pilot on O2 only when operating above FL470). Maybe they just fucked up. When you're flying the same 9-10 hour flight every other day, it gets mundane and you get complacent.
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Posted: 1/22/2021 9:58:21 PM EDT
[#16]
Quote HistoryQuoted:Why couldn't they get the engine started again? They tried several attempts. It was cold-soaked. |
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Posted: 1/22/2021 11:54:30 PM EDT
[#17]
Quote HistoryQuoted: They tried several attempts. It was cold-soaked. Quote HistoryQuoted: They tried several attempts. It was cold-soaked. The airstart procedures in the DUAL ENGINE OUT checklist direct the start of both engines, but the MC may have concluded that the right engine suffered damage and therefore only elected to airstart the left engine (Tab AA-23). Not airstarting a damaged engine would be consistent with specific stipulations in the E-11A Single Engine Procedures Checklist (Tab AA-21). ... The Rolls Royce engines on the E-11A are highly reliable and have demonstrated airstart capability in several flight test scenarios (Tab J-29 to J-30). While the MC would have waited, in accordance with the checklist, to 30,000 feet to attempt an airstart, an airstart of the right engine should have been successful, whether accomplished with windmilling airspeed or with the assistance of the APU (Tab J-36). However, airstarts of the left engine would have failed due to the original damage (Tab J-35). There is no DFDR data to definitively confirm whether an engine airstart attempt was made (Tab J-36). |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 1:04:44 AM EDT
[#18]
Quote HistoryQuoted: From the report linked above The report says "There is no DFDR data to definitively confirm whether an engine airstart attempt was made". Rumor is that they attempted it. |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 1:18:02 AM EDT
[#19]
Quote HistoryThe Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was the MC's error in analyzing which engine had catastrophically failed (left engine). This error resulted in the MC's decision to shutdown the operable right engine creating a dual engine out emergency. The AIB President also found by a preponderance of the evidence that the MC's failure to airstart the right engine and their decision to recover the MA to KAF substantially contributed the mishap. |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 11:34:11 AM EDT
[#20]
Quote HistoryQuoted: We'll never know what happened for sure, but Paul Voss probably had more hours in the E11 than any other pilot in the Air Force. Training a new guy...don't know if the new guy over-reacted. (He wasn't a new pilot, just new to the airframe) When I first heard back in Jan, I thought the cabin may have rapidly decompressed and they didn't get masks on in time. (We were required to have one pilot on O2 only when operating above FL470). Maybe they just fucked up. When you're flying the same 9-10 hour flight every other day, it gets mundane and you get complacent. Complacency combined with startle factor can be a deadly mix, regardless of experience and proficiency. I say this as the guy whose video of his SAM threat reaction in Iraq was so shitty and against so many tactics and procedures, that it was used at USAF Weapons School for a time as an example of what not to do. Why? Complacency and startle factor. There are volumes upon volumes of examples of highly qualified, highly trained, highly experienced, and highly thought-of pilots "inexplicably" doing the *wrong* thing at a critical moment. The reality is, those mistakes can be made by anyone at any time, regardless of experience. Training can be a good antidote to such things. Experience is also a brutal teacher of such lessons, too. But still, human performance is like that. |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 12:05:25 PM EDT
[#21]
Quote HistoryQuoted: I'm no pilot but it seems crazy you couldn't tell what engine was out, left or right. I see now this is a bus jet aircraft, so hard to look out the cockpit and see what the engines are doing. Sad. I would assume the cockpit instruments would have indicated a change in status of the failed engine? What is surprising after reading the report, is that they have multiple options close (17 miles or 38 miles away) but instead tried to glide 230 miles instead?? The plane was in range to glide to and land at either Kabul International Airport in eastern Afghanistan, 17 nautical miles away, or Bagram Airfield, 38 nautical miles away, it adds. At one point, the pilots could have glided to Forward Operating Base Shank -- 28 nautical miles away -- but had only an eight-minute window to begin that maneuver, the report states. Instead, the crew, flying at about 41,000 feet, decided to initiate an airstart on the right engine and head toward Kandahar Airfield -- 230 nautical miles southwest from their position. An airstart uses the aircraft's airspeed to turn the engine turbines, a move that would require the aircraft to travel at 258 knots per hour. The aircraft, a modified Bombardier Global Express BD-700, can reach a max speed of about 505 knots. "... Mayday, Mayday, Mayday … it looks like we have an engine failure on both motors. We are proceeding direct to Kandahar at this time," one of the pilots is heard radioing to Air Traffic Control, per the report. However, the aircraft was outside of the gliding distance to reach Kandahar; instead, the pilots tried maneuvering toward Forward Operating Base Sharana, about 217 nautical miles to the east of Kandahar. But it crashed in a field 21 nautical miles short of Sharana. If you have both engines out, why wouldn't the aircrew select those nearer suitable runways to land? the other surprise factor in reading the report is that the CVR & DFR (black boxes) both were disabled in the dual engine shutdown. Because of that, the investigators were without actual data of what happened in the cockpit or what actions were taken. Seems like in this age a simple battery back up source would be prudent. |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 2:00:23 PM EDT
[#22]
I suspect they fully expected at least one engine to start, looking back obviously this decision was wrong. They probably did think let's see if we can dead engine glide 200+ miles. Unattended dual engine flame out is not that common, perhaps that was the design consideration for the lack of backup batteries.
And yes the cockpit indications were likely obvious, but as I said fog of war crap happens; which mudeagle explained better; complacency and being startled will makes even the best have less than average performance and poor decision making. |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 3:12:22 PM EDT
[#23]
Quote HistoryQuoted: If you have both engines out, why wouldn't the aircrew select those nearer suitable runways to land? Lots of possible reasons they didn't make decisions that seem obvious at zero knots and 1G. My initial thought would be continuation bias. But, it may also be that they were task-saturated dealing with the immediate issues in the cockpit that they weren't aware of the closer fields at those moments when they had to make that decision. Are there any Global/E-11 dudes on the forum who know how the FMS "nearest airport" logic works, or how it might have been set up on those airplanes in Afghanistan? Any of that could be potentially combined with that natural pilot "this can't be happening to me" denial when things go sideways, which feeds back into that continuation bias. Barring those, there's the equally dangerous "I can fix it/we can make it work" problem-solver reaction that causes so many pilots in ejection seat aircraft to delay the decision to eject (generally leading to fatalities). We generally don't want to admit it (especially in public), but there's also that dual-edged sword of fear that your errors *caused* whatever the dangerous/emergency situation is that is unfolding, and the kneejerk (and thoroughly unrealistic) desire to cover that up so nobody finds out you screwed up. Human factors is a science that we don't even remotely understand the Alpha-to-Omega of, unfortunately. |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 3:16:53 PM EDT
[#24]
Quote HistoryQuoted: If you have both engines out, why wouldn't the aircrew select those nearer suitable runways to land? A couple things that come to mind... One, due to the sensitive nature of what was onboard, it was a royal pain in the ass the few times we needed to divert, especially for the FOBs. KAF was always the primary. A couple times, when I was just chilling up in the 50s, I'd plot out how far different places were and if I could make them in a glide. It was just to kill the boredom though. There was never any actual consideration given that we'd have to glide to those places. Another, I've gotten turned around flying all over that damned country from Killbox XY to a certain GPS position, etc. Once done, "Oh shit, I'm over namesomerandomFOB now". Also, being unfamiliar with them, never having flown into them, having to find where you're at, approach and runway setup, etc. it's human nature to go back to what you know....especially dealing with an emergency. Not saying it's correct, just trying to reason why they did what they did and hope I would have made a better decision. |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 5:32:12 PM EDT
[#25]
1. Maintain aircraft control
2. Analyze the situation 3. Take appropriate action. Page one of the red book for the first aircraft I was qualified in, and it was bold face - so it got treated as a memory item for every student I took on a syllabus flight. Fast hands in the cockpit tend to cause more problems than they fix. RIP Airmen |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 5:50:36 PM EDT
[#26]
Sad to hear this. I thought of those airmen a few weeks ago.
The wrong engine shutdown reminds me of the C-5 crash at Dover AFB a few years back. |
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Posted: 1/23/2021 11:25:43 PM EDT
[#27]
Quote HistoryQuoted: You usually only have seconds to respond to an eng out in a multi engine before you’re in an unrecoverable situation. It’s not uncommon to pull the wrong engine offline, especially if they are both next to each other or at the tail or something. Usually the best bet is to look for the one with dropping oil pressure. It’s not like a single engine where if it fails you can just chillax and think things through. Chillax and think things through is EXACTLY what you do in a modern multi-engine aircraft. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 12:09:30 AM EDT
[#28]
Quote HistoryQuoted: They were in a Bombardier BD-700, in cruise, at 43,000ft. In this type of aircraft, under those conditions, unless there is some sort of explosive type damage that compromises the handling characteristics of the aircraft, or a fire that can't be put out, losing an engine is almost a complete non-event. Sure, there are plenty of aircraft that become a handful when they lose an engine on takeoff, and even some that can be an issue at altitude, but these tend to be piston powered aircraft, not a jet like this. Reading the report, it does appear that they had some very bad vibrations, but they were not losing altitude in any significant way, nor should they with one engine still running properly. It is easy to imagine with vibrations of the magnitude described in the report that the pilot(s) would want to do something Right Now, but unfortunately that pilot made the wrong decision. Here's a very interesting video that describes just how "non" such a non-event can be in a business jet. At least until you lose both engines! Of course these guys did not experience any dramatic shaking of the aircraft. But it is still a good discussion of the performance margins and handling qualities of a typical business jet with one engine inoperative (OEI). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKxgne1J2pUI still remember my T-1A and T-6A HAPL math. 2:1 glide ratios on each, roughly. If you could make over the approach end traveling over the runway at 4000 AGL in the T-1 and 2000 AGL in the T-6, you could do an idle/engine-out 360 degree circle to land with the gear down at high key (approach end), and landing flaps in the base turn past the low key (halfway down halfway around position flying downwind direction), and land. You base your engine-out landing ability on this and the glide ratio math, and thankfully the -1 actually listed best engine-out glide speeds AND had a distance chart for altitude. Not that I'd ever want to be digging in the -1 performance pages with an engine-out in the T-1. T-6, you memorized that shit and it actually got graded, too. At least the T-6 had a yeet seat though. T-1A dual engine failure is a bad day. I'm not aware of the beech 400 type ever having a dual engine failure though. JT-15D engines are pretty reliable. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 8:41:36 AM EDT
[#29]
Quote HistoryQuoted: They tried several attempts. It was cold-soaked. Quote HistoryQuoted: Quoted:Why couldn't they get the engine started again? They tried several attempts. It was cold-soaked. Cold soaked? Lol. To clarify I read the report. No voice or data recordings after good engine was shut down so no way to know what actually happened after that. Since they shut down the good engine it seems plausible to me that they attempted to restart the bad engine, but the world will never know. If they had attempted to restart the good engine there is no known reason it would not have started. What is known is that they knew both engines were out and that they then passed up three perfectly good runways within in glide for the runway they came from which was well beyond glide at 200+nm away. Sorta off topic, but I find it interesting to contrast this report to the previous one discussed here where the guy undershot a visual approach and hit the ils antennas and subsequently ejected. In this one they squarely blame the pilots but the other one they blamed everything except the pilot. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 11:13:49 AM EDT
[#30]
Quote HistoryQuoted: T-1A dual engine failure is a bad day. I'm not aware of the beech 400 type ever having a dual engine failure though. JT-15D engines are pretty reliable. There have been four. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 11:16:53 AM EDT
[#31]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Cold soaked? Lol. To clarify I read the report. No voice or data recordings after good engine was shut down so no way to know what actually happened after that. Since they shut down the good engine it seems plausible to me that they attempted to restart the bad engine, but the world will never know. If they had attempted to restart the good engine there is no known reason it would not have started. What is known is that they knew both engines were out and that they then passed up three perfectly good runways within in glide for the runway they came from which was well beyond glide at 200+nm away. Sorta off topic, but I find it interesting to contrast this report to the previous one discussed here where the guy undershot a visual approach and hit the ils antennas and subsequently ejected. In this one they squarely blame the pilots but the other one they blamed everything except the pilot. I think he means “core locked.” I know of at least two aircraft manuals where the first action is airspeed minimum precisely to avoid core locking. ETA: according to a Pratt rep, his argument was cruise speed airflow should be sufficient to ensure no core lock, as you essentially demonstrate that all the time as engines are reduced to idle all the time at altitude, and core speed is maintained via fan ram. That said, he said that airspeed is no guarantee if the alpha and engine installation would cause burbles or other flow interruption that allows core decay and lock. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 11:18:55 AM EDT
[#32]
Failure to properly assess which engine has failed.
I've read it so many times it's not even funny. The aircraft is pushing one way. They pull back power, the aircraft straightens out... and they shut down the operable engine. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 1:34:04 PM EDT
[#33]
Quote HistoryQuoted: I think he means “core locked.” I don't now anything about that plane/engine, but certainly would be something to look into if they hadn't blown it in place. We'll never know what happened though, seems the best takeaway is no fast hands in the cockpit unless really necessary. Also, I remember my first instructor's adage of things that are useless to a pilot - one of them being runway behind you. I can't fathom even considering a field over 200 miles away when I was within sight of an international airport and a massive US airbase with a 2+ mile runway. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 3:12:32 PM EDT
[#34]
Quote HistoryQuoted: I think he means “core locked.” I know of at least two aircraft manuals where the first action is airspeed minimum precisely to avoid core locking. ETA: according to a Pratt rep, his argument was cruise speed airflow should be sufficient to ensure no core lock, as you essentially demonstrate that all the time as engines are reduced to idle all the time at altitude, and core speed is maintained via fan ram. That said, he said that airspeed is no guarantee if the alpha and engine installation would cause burbles or other flow interruption that allows core decay and lock. While it's certainly possible to 'lock up' a core; I'd be surprised if you could with that engine and that situation. At least to the point of not being able to start it. Usually, if you get in a situation like that... it'll start, but you're going to rub the heck out of it. It's windmilling, so there should be some air going through it to cool it down. This is a Global Express, but with the Challengers I know BA does airstarts during acceptance testing, and we used to see significant margin degradation if they left it off for too long. It starts, but it rubs, and now your clearances are wider inside the engine. Really... you don't see the damage, per se, until Hot Section or Overhaul. For those of you who are lost here...  Typically, The HP Compressor is driven by the HP Turbine. The LP Compressor (and fan, usually) is driven by the LP Turbine. The shaft for the LP runs inside the shaft for the HP. When you shut the engine down, the various parts of the engine cool at different rates... and that means they shrink at different rates. This means that the clearances - usually in the 0.010-0.020" range, though it will vary by manufacturer, part, engine, and wear - will change as the engine cools. This leads to requirements in the manuals that you let the engine completely cool - or that you 'motor' it; basically spinning all the components and pumping air through it without the flame - so that none of the clearances go to zero - and then you try to spin it. Some engines will completely 'lock up' if you don't follow the correct procedures. Usually, if you do lock the engine up, it will unlock after a while, as the engine naturally cools. My guess - I don't know the BR710 very well at all - is that gliding should be pumping enough air through the engine to keep it from totally locking up, and that the crew never attempted a restart on the good engine, and were instead attempting to restart the bad engine. And bladeouts are baaad - one of those big fan blades in the front 'liberating' itself from the rest of the fan, all the while spinning at high speed. I have no doubt it shook the heck out of the airplane. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 8:00:55 PM EDT
[#35]
Quote HistoryQuoted: There have been four. Got a source? I'd love to read into it. Everything is independent with regards to the engine so I'd have to guess weather, fuel, or fuel exhaustion as the root causes. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 8:23:45 PM EDT
[#36]
Things happen. But shouldn't be happening fast in a jet at cruise altitudes.
Yesterday in the sim the guy next to me tried to pull the T-handle on the wrong engine. Our procedure requires both pilots to look at them and verify before they are pulled. I was able to catch his mistake before he shut down a good engine. |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 11:24:28 PM EDT
[#37]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Sad. I would assume the cockpit instruments would have indicated a change in status of the failed engine? What is surprising after reading the report, is that they have multiple options close (17 miles or 38 miles away) but instead tried to glide 230 miles instead?? The plane was in range to glide to and land at either Kabul International Airport in eastern Afghanistan, 17 nautical miles away, or Bagram Airfield, 38 nautical miles away, it adds. At one point, the pilots could have glided to Forward Operating Base Shank -- 28 nautical miles away -- but had only an eight-minute window to begin that maneuver, the report states. Instead, the crew, flying at about 41,000 feet, decided to initiate an airstart on the right engine and head toward Kandahar Airfield -- 230 nautical miles southwest from their position. An airstart uses the aircraft's airspeed to turn the engine turbines, a move that would require the aircraft to travel at 258 knots per hour. The aircraft, a modified Bombardier Global Express BD-700, can reach a max speed of about 505 knots. "... Mayday, Mayday, Mayday … it looks like we have an engine failure on both motors. We are proceeding direct to Kandahar at this time," one of the pilots is heard radioing to Air Traffic Control, per the report. However, the aircraft was outside of the gliding distance to reach Kandahar; instead, the pilots tried maneuvering toward Forward Operating Base Sharana, about 217 nautical miles to the east of Kandahar. But it crashed in a field 21 nautical miles short of Sharana. If you have both engines out, why wouldn't the aircrew select those nearer suitable runways to land? the other surprise factor in reading the report is that the CVR & DFR (black boxes) both were disabled in the dual engine shutdown. Because of that, the investigators were without actual data of what happened in the cockpit or what actions were taken. Seems like in this age a simple battery back up source would be prudent. The report stated a possible reason for not turning toward Bagram initially - they fully expected to get an engine online. It seems likely that the severe vibration and spurious engine vibration alert on the right engine convinced them that the right engine was the problem, and that they spent their time trying to start the left one, which had in fact failed. By the time they gave up on the restart attempts, they had used up their time and altitude. For the recording equipment - it wasn't just a question of power - the CVR had power, but shut off because the vibration activated a switch intended to prevent the CVR from overwriting itself after a crash. In the case of the FDR, it doesn't matter if you have a battery on the recorder if the sensors you are recording don't. When engineers decide what gets powered when systems start failing, keeping the battery powering essential flight systems for as long as possible is more important than powering data recorders that won't help anyone on the plane at the time. Mike |
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Posted: 1/24/2021 11:28:10 PM EDT
[#38]
With my company there are no emergency memory items dealing with engine failures. It’s all checklist driven in order to prevent things like this happening.
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Posted: 1/24/2021 11:38:23 PM EDT
[#39]
Quote HistoryQuoted: With my company there are no emergency memory items dealing with engine failures. It’s all checklist driven in order to prevent things like this happening. At my airline, we have an Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation memory item. |
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Posted: 1/25/2021 12:12:00 AM EDT
[#40]
Quote HistoryQuoted: At my airline, we have an Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation memory item. Interestingly, not a boxed item on the Bus. |
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Posted: 1/25/2021 12:21:55 AM EDT
[#41]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Got a source? I'd love to read into it. Everything is independent with regards to the engine so I'd have to guess weather, fuel, or fuel exhaustion as the root causes. Here is One from the AIN. The number depends on both reporting and how you count. Two of the events were Flight Options Beechjets, one was a Colombian registered bird, and two other events happened, one in the US and one in Brazil, but the data on them was incomplete and contradictory. The Flight Options SRQ event, and from reporting the other US registered a/c and the Brazil incident all had the crew restart one or both engines. The Flight Options JAX event and the Colombian event in 2015 ended up being dead-stick landings. Pratt blamed convective icing at altitude. Fuel contamination or exhaustion was not a factor in any event to my knowledge. There was some consideration that the lack of PRIST was an issue in the LATAM accidents as PRIST is hard to find outside the US. However, both crews said they had PRIST injected at last fueling. |
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Posted: 1/25/2021 1:57:44 AM EDT
[#42]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Cold soaked? Lol. To clarify I read the report. No voice or data recordings after good engine was shut down so no way to know what actually happened after that. Since they shut down the good engine it seems plausible to me that they attempted to restart the bad engine, but the world will never know. If they had attempted to restart the good engine there is no known reason it would not have started. What is known is that they knew both engines were out and that they then passed up three perfectly good runways within in glide for the runway they came from which was well beyond glide at 200+nm away. Sorta off topic, but I find it interesting to contrast this report to the previous one discussed here where the guy undershot a visual approach and hit the ils antennas and subsequently ejected. In this one they squarely blame the pilots but the other one they blamed everything except the pilot. Apologies.. Three type ratings after flying the E-11 and the terms get jumbled. I didn't think they called it core locked either...now I'm going to have to see if I can find the ole Dash-1. But, as the report says "The airspeed and later use of the APU suggest that both windmilling and APU-assisted airstarts were attempted". Squadron-mates that were on duty that day said they tried to re-start it. Definitely could have been trying to start the left side though, which would have been impossible. |
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Posted: 1/25/2021 10:06:51 AM EDT
[#43]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Here is One from the AIN. The number depends on both reporting and how you count. Two of the events were Flight Options Beechjets, one was a Colombian registered bird, and two other events happened, one in the US and one in Brazil, but the data on them was incomplete and contradictory. The Flight Options SRQ event, and from reporting the other US registered a/c and the Brazil incident all had the crew restart one or both engines. The Flight Options JAX event and the Colombian event in 2015 ended up being dead-stick landings. Pratt blamed convective icing at altitude. Fuel contamination or exhaustion was not a factor in any event to my knowledge. There was some consideration that the lack of PRIST was an issue in the LATAM accidents as PRIST is hard to find outside the US. However, both crews said they had PRIST injected at last fueling. That's probably why the -1 had a hard requirement for pre-mixed Jet-A+PRIST. Thank you for the insight. |
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Posted: 1/25/2021 10:57:32 AM EDT
[#44]
Quote HistoryQuoted: That's probably why the -1 had a hard requirement for pre-mixed Jet-A+PRIST. Thank you for the insight. The PRIST requirements predated the flameouts, but yes, it’s a hard requirement for an aircraft without fuel heaters like the MU300/BE400. Additionally, the Diamond/Bjet wing is a notorious water collector. While PRIST no long advertises an anti-microbial function, in sequestering water in finer droplets, it does reduce the matting tendency of fuel tank microbial growth. |
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Posted: 1/25/2021 8:48:19 PM EDT
[#45]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Interestingly, not a boxed item on the Bus. Quote HistoryQuoted: Quoted: At my airline, we have an Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation memory item. Interestingly, not a boxed item on the Bus. We did away with all our red box items on the 737 a few years ago, from 11 when I first checked out. Everything was on the quick reference card. Now with the MAX return to service we got some of them back. |
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Posted: 1/25/2021 9:19:57 PM EDT
[#46]
Quote HistoryQuoted: We did away with all our red box items on the 737 a few years ago, from 11 when I first checked out. Everything was on the quick reference card. Now with the MAX return to service we got some of them back. Speaking to the folks at Flight Safety, memory items are going away industry wide. That doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to me but I fly a dinosaur so I doubt I’ll see any revised checklists any time soon. |
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Posted: 1/25/2021 11:51:53 PM EDT
[#47]
Not many things you need to be in a hurry for, read and do should prevent shutting down the wrong engine. Nothing is fool proof.
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Posted: 1/26/2021 11:12:15 AM EDT
[#48]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Speaking to the folks at Flight Safety, memory items are going away industry wide. That doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to me but I fly a dinosaur so I doubt I’ll see any revised checklists any time soon. As the Airbus philosophy with an aircraft integrated checklist slowly propagates through new aircraft designs, the need for memory items will slowly reduce (though it shouldn’t disappear, IMO.) There are emergencies like data failures or environmental conditions like wind shear or terrain warning that should have immediate crew action. It should be common sense to pull up from terrain, or TOGA from wind shear or follow TCAS directions but people still don’t do it. |
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Posted: 1/26/2021 2:48:33 PM EDT
[#49]
Quote HistoryQuoted: This accident seems like one hell of a tragic training failure. Wondered about this. It is an uncommon aircraft (at least to me) and the training wasn't conducive to safe operation. There can't be that many, and a lot of training may have been farmed-out to contractor/civilian outfits? |
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Posted: 1/26/2021 6:40:10 PM EDT
[#50]
Quote HistoryQuoted: Wondered about this. It is an uncommon aircraft (at least to me) and the training wasn't conducive to safe operation. There can't be that many, and a lot of training may have been farmed-out to contractor/civilian outfits? I’m purely speculating here, no first hand knowledge. My guess is they went to a bombardier approved 142 course at FSI or CAE. The biggest issue with civilian aviation, I think, is they work so hard to pass everyone. It’s possible this was the case with one of the crew but I couldn’t speak to that. |
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