LOL ... fanboi alert

Yep I'm done

I pulled a new 6441 from inventory today. Sorry, too busy to put up pictures, but I will try to take some snaps tomorrow. Nothing has changed in the lock that I checked.

The label says Type 1 (which is the electronic rating). There is no marking for any mechanical rating. I know what LaGard needs to include in the lock to make it Group 2M or Group 1, and none of that hardware is present. There would be a secondary trip arm that prevents the primary lever from falling until it is released over the drop point, and the 6441 lock I checked does NOT have that mechanism.

I stand by my previous conclusions... the 6441 lock can not have a Group 2M or Group 1 mechanical rating. Unless there was a recent change, and our inventory is stale, the lock rating is as I said previously.

I did say, at one point, that the lock had a Group 1 rating, but again I may have been going on what Kaba stated, not the first hand observation. I admit this has been a confusing issue, but as another patron has stated, the UL site does not show the 6441 to have a Group 2M or Group 1 rating. That should resolve the issue, strife aside.

I have a lagard 2441 that is about 10 years old. The lock only has Type-1 on the label, no mention of group-1.

However, the install manual that came with the lock is titled "LA GARD Redundant Mechanical Lock 2441/6441 Electronic and 4-Wheel Group 1 Lock"

Kind of funny, I assume some tech writer mixed up Group 1 and Type 1 when they wrote the manual...this only adds to the confusion ;)

---Aaron

TSG YOU ARE WRONG sorry and my safe will have both 6441 and TL-30 placard and it won't say AMSEC


[email protected]                                  Jan 21 (4 days ago)

to me
Hi

The 4 wheel is UL Group 1. The electronic is UL Type 1.

Orlando
Orlando Consalvi
SR. SALES MANAGER-OEM SALES


UL TL-30 requires a Combination lock Group 1, 1R or 2M or UL type 1 electronic. The 6441 4 wheel combination lock has a Group 1 rating on the combination portion as Orlando from Kaba stated and a Type 1 rating on the electronic portion of the lock.

It’s funny that this amsec engineer talks about UL ratings as there ESL lock has been pending UL approval for years and we all know UL approval doesn’t take that long J

I also attached the picture of the 6441 lock label.
Thank You,
Tim Brown - Chief Operations Officer
Brown Safe Mfg


Sorry GrayMan I tried to stay quiet but this guy just keeps doubling down with nothing but a stale opinion

Can anyone post a link to the 6441 on Kaba's website? They have all the other LaGard locks on there, but all I can find on their site with a search is the directions for the older model...?

And if it really is a UL listed lock, why can't it be found on UL's listing?

Again, nobody cares about your safe. Amsec is not going to hold a meeting about how the great "renotse" didn't buy a safe from them. This isn't' even your thread yet you keep yammering on.

As I said in my last post and has now been confirmed, there is no Group 1 label on the lock itself. UL requires the product to have the mark on it as part of the listing. So that's Kaba's mistake for not putting it on there (or they don't have the listing, which I doubt).

You mean this UL approval listed on the UL site? Or do you mean some other AMSEC ESL lock?
UL list

Not an AMSEC fanboy, I have a graffunder safe in my house, but I have also learned a great deal from this forum from people like TSG and Frank.

You on the other hand, have been throwing out info you aquired second hand that you still cant provide a link to, UL's own site doesnt list it, the manufacturer doesnt even have the product on its website, and you got a couple emails back and forth from the company stating its approved... You may want to pull back those guns a bit until you have a little more education to back them up.

renotse

Keep going.  Your ** EDIT ** is getting better and better the more you post.  Bless your heart.

Don't contribute to the problem.  -TGM-

I am not at all happy with the way Renotse has conducted himself in this thread but you are pretty new here so understand the tech forums are NOT the same as that old time free for all known as General Discussion.

Again, I have to be clear, I have no derogatory motives here, other than to get the facts right and follow the rules that UL binds a manufacturer to follow. So, here is what I know to be true.

1. A lock MUST have the appropriate rating displayed on the lock to be installed on a safe per UL687.

2. The 6441 Lock only shows a Type 1 rating. No mechanical rating is shown. See label photo HERE.

3. The 4-wheel Group 1 LaGard (Kaba Mas model LG1958) locks include a Lever Blocking Arm. See a good image HERE. Click on the picture to zoom. Note the brass colored spring loaded flat arm on the top.

4. The 6441 Lock does not have the Lever Blocking Arm to prevent manipulation, so it can't be rated Group 1 Mechanical. See the lock internal photo HERE.

5. When there is a dual rating, the lesser of the two listings determines the qualification to install on a given safe rating. This was confirmed in a conversation with the top UL Engineer managing the Burglary Protection and Signalling department

6. A TL-15 or TL-30 safe must have a minimum Type 1 Electronic Lock or Group 2M Mechanical Lock (UL687 Standard).

I don't mean to call anyone a liar, nor get anyone in trouble. I am merely stating the facts. I admit there was a degree of confusion due to product and rating changes, as well as literature and instructions that disagree with the physical mechanics and the labeling. When we discovered the NL Locks did not have the Group 2M or Group 1 ratings, we asked Kaba, and they said theirs did. I later came to believe they were mistaken.  Sorry I didn't go back and make a correction post.

I got 21 rentose, dealer busts. Pay the man on the Double Down.

TSG, can you ask one of your contacts at UL to research this issue and see if the 2441/6441 was ever awarded a Group 1 listing? It seems like it should be fairly simple for them to answer one way or the other.  La Gard and  then Kaba Mas have been marketing this lock as a Group 1 lock for over 20 years, so it would be a fairly big deal if they didn't have the listing.

UL will not discuss listing details on products with anyone other than the owner of the listing. They have very strict privacy policies on proprietary information. Besides that, I don't want to throw anyone under the bus, and such an inquiry may cause repercussions. Our policy decisions are to follow the rules as we interpret them.

This issue is between a safe maker that chooses to install the lock on a rated safe and UL. It's not our place to raise concerns about any other safe company's practices. If a manufacturer installs an inappropriate lock type, the random Follow Up Services inspection process is in place to discover that impropriety. If an inspector is not up on his/her game to know that the lock is not qualified, it's never brought to light. It would be that Inspection Engineer's place to make the inquiries about the lock maker's particular listings.

Man.  Can' t even step away for a bit without things getting all crazy.  

First and foremost, TSG has nothing to do with the problems I was having with his company.  In fact, he reached out to assist if needed.  So although I believe some of the people at his company dropped the ball, he is, was, and has been as stand-up as one would expect.   And even though it took a bit longer than it should have, the situation has been resolved to the customer's satisfaction, and what's done is done.

But since we've shifted to the 6441 discussion, I did have a few phone conversations today.  One of the people I was able to speak with has some in depth experience with Kaba's R&D, and another is with a competing company working on similar projects.  This is what I was told, and it just so happens to make sense:

UL does not have a category for redundant locks, and it does not offer dual ratings for locks with dual functions.  As far as the 6441 goes, it was submitted for testing as it is designed, and it achieved a UL Type 1 certification.  UL would have obviously considered the mechanical portion of the lock along with the electronics during their testing.  Since it does have a UL Type 1 rating, it is indeed suitable for use on any UL rated safe where a Type 1 lock is acceptable for use.

So I supposed this is a bit contrary to their paperwork stating that it is a Group 1 lock, because as it stands, the lock does not have a Group 1 rating.  

WOW! And boom goes the dynamite!

That is very shocking to me that they would have been advertising and stating it to be a Group 1 lock in all their literature for decades. No one called them on it before TSG. It makes perfect sense because there aren't any anti-manipulation features in the lock. I just figured they slipped one past UL in the early 90s and got it passed because of the "weird" lever design.

As for their explanation that there's no UL listing to address redundant locks, didn't the NL Duo receive a Type 1 AND a Group 2 listing?

I wonder how many people bought/ordered a safe with this lock thinking they were getting a real deal Group 1 lock for the mechanical portion.

I bought them for the redundancy aspect and the worry that I might have to have TL-30 safe drilled if the the electronic failed, which I understand is primary mode of failure, unless your unlucky enough to have an AMSEC BF that just explodes like the one pictured in the OP  

But what do I know, I'm just a consumer, not an expert.

I see that both listings are shown on their paperwork, but I have never seen one of these in person, and have no idea what the labels on the lock say.  Perhaps it was submitting for testing under each category?  Perhaps like the LaGard the paperwork doesn't reflect reality?

Same guy designed both locks.  Maybe he wrote both manuals.  




Maybe that's what they actually have?  This does interest me, as Kaba has some newer redundant locks out that use a key.  They also have UL ratings.

Right......we're just gonna pretend 20 years of advertising as Group 1 and all those quotes you provided of a Brown safe executive and  multiple Kaba Mas employees stating it's a Group 1 lock?

Remember all that?

Your mileage may vary, but I bought these locks for the redundancy aspect.

I think I uderstand what happened. This is the result of changes at UL. The 4 wheel lock proably had a Group 1 rating when it was tested, I think around 1998 or so, I don't recall. In 2008 the UL687 changed and implemented the new requirement for a 2M lock on TL15/30. All of the lock requirements changed, and the Type 1 listing was still in good standing. This mechanical aspect of this hybrid lock was overlooked on UL's side. The manipulation requirements all changed. All the lock companies went to work to get Group 2M and new Group 1 locks to market.

A side note.... NL Locks admits that they don't have Group 2M or Group 1 ratings. Susan Papa at NL Locks said it was techincally a Group 2 lock (not 2M). Now, NL Locks was founded by the same guy that founded LaGard, Nick Gartner (Susan's father BTW). The two locks are mechanically identical, and I believe the parts are  mostly interchangeable. Nick holds all the patents, and when his domestic no compete agreement expired, he had already retooled all the same products under the NL Locks badge in Germany and China for sale in Europe. So, you can see how this could slip thru the cracks.

Seems like as good a theory as any

One of my problems with redundant locks was that the LaGard (now Kaba) was the only lock that sported a UL sticker of any type.  There are a handful of options out there, and TL rated safes make them attractive in order to avoid a costly drill job.  There are other locksmiths and safe techs that have installed these other locks on TL rated units, when they probably should not have.

Ultimately I would still have no problem using the 6441 on a TL rated safes because the standards say a Type 1 lock is acceptable, and UL says the lock is a Type 1.  If there was any issue that turned into a potential liability, then that's on Kaba and UL.

self delete

** self delete **

So will AMSEC have a chance to inspect the safe to figure out what happened? I would like to know what their conclusion is.

it seems this thread has lost focus, it's been weeks since the safe has been replaced yet  no detailed pics or breakdown of the damage by frank.so the question everyone wants to know is what exactly happened to the safe in question and should I be worried it can happen to mine?

so frank we are waiting, have you done your autopsy of the amsec and determined why it suffered a untimely demise? was it owner rage/damage as tsg implied or a actual swelling of the cement like filling causing the seams to burst?

I have not.  The warehouse where I have the safe is not climate controlled, and it has been so cold lately I haven't invested much time out there.  I will get to it eventually.  I promise.

I have a big AMSEC BF and it makes a huge "WOOSH" as air escapes when you slowly close the door.  I wouldn't do it, but it I tried to slam it I doubt there would be enough momentum to overcome the air pressure on the other side of that door.  

It's been a good safe so far, hope I never have a warranty issue.  Even if they replaced it, I'd be pretty PO'd if they didn't believe that I didn't slam the door in a fit of rage..........instead patted me on the head and said "you're lying, but we're going to try to displace the public shaming onto you the customer (and rather than take it ourselves for blowing you off initially before having the evidence)".  Well you reap what you sow.

I appreciate customer opinion more than you know. However, if you read this thread, you will see that the myth that was initially posed that the fill somehow expanded to cause this damage has been soundly dismissed. There is no way that the fill could expand enough to measure without a micrometer, even under extreme temperature swings. This safe is 3 years old, so there is no possibility there was some sudden chemical or mechanical "reaction" that came from nowhere.

Practical reasoning and logical thinking must come into play at some point. I challenge anyone to come up with any other plausible (and realistic) cause for such damages that could happen without any user interaction. Believe me, I have pondered the wildest of possibilities, and there is no physical process that could innately react to cause the visible damages we can see in the photos provided. I have carefully explained the physical mechanisms to explain all the visible damages, please read it carefully before you offer an opinion on the situation.

The woosh of pressure release as a door is closed is not adequate to prevent door slamming, I assure you of that. The big 1/2 thick steel door on that safe carries far more momentum than a little trapped air can stop. We have had customers and employees sever fingers by slamming doors on safes like this. That mass of steel is formidable, and physics dictate a predictable and violent crash if that door is swung hard. If you don't believe me, take a chuck of clay or dough, and stick it to the jamb and progressively swing the door shut harder and harder. You will see the result, and it won't take all that much to crush your target. We use clay to check door gap quality all the time, so I am acutely aware of how these doors close.

Frank, when you get back to that safe, and do your forensic evaluation and additional photos, please take a good swing at slamming to prove to yourself that a hard swing will cause a major impact of the back door face into the jambs in the body. Before that, measure the distance with a caliper from the 1/2 plate surface to the back face of the door pan in multiple places around the door perimeter. I am confident you will find that the corner in question is crushed, not expanded. You can see the dent in the corner in the photos, and that is clearly responsible for that corner joint buckling and bulging open like it has.

You can call me an ass all you want. I don't care. I am not speaking on behalf of the company, I am offering my personal opinion as an engineer working in a safe factory for 28 years. This kind of damage can only come from impact, by slamming the door or by tipping and dropping the safe on it's back. The evidence doesn't support any other conclusions. I am appalled by the thought that anyone would think less of a manufacturer for clearly providing such benevolent support when it's not warranted.

Let that bashing begin....

I appreciate your engagement GrayMan. I don't mean to incite a riot, but I do need to ask people to think and realize that bashing is unfounded in this case. I tried to explain myself, but I think long detailed posts are rarely read carefully so the technical points are overlooked. If we had a hand in the damages here, I will be the first to admit it and see that corrective action is taken to prevent future incidents. I am here to offer technical advice and answer questions as an individual, not a corporate shill, but I do take what I see here and make issue of it internally at work so we can be better in the future. When someone reports a problem, our management team hears about it so we can improve. The feedback here on ARFCOM has an impact on our operations, and I am very appreciative of the insight.

While I am curious as to the outcome of the analysis I wouldn't hesitate to buy another AMSEC BF safe to replace mine if I needed to.  I was looking at mine the other day as well and I just don't see how the fill could expand enough to cause the damage seen in the photos.

Well I am in the market for a new safe and I don't think any less of Amsec because of this thread.

IMO marketers (or members directly associated with one) put themselves in awkward positions when they participate actively in forums like these. Sure there is plenty of good information and insight to be had, but there is also the occasional direct jab by disgruntled client to deal with. Then the ladder gets documented for everyone to see and pass further judgement. Most manufacturers would have just pleaded the fifth with this and moved on. To me this thread was only created for the sole purpose of instigating and documenting a response directly from Amsec.

I think it's great that you take time to interact with and educate the folks who purchase products that you help design. I have learned quite a bit about safes from reading your posts....

Please keep this thread open, and give time-outs if necessary- I know it's a lot of work for you, but several posters have put considerable effort into this whole mess.

This needs to come to a conclusion, with the additional examination to come.

Many have opinions on both sides of this, and the whole truth of the matter will come if allowed to continue.

And thanks!

^^ Agreed

Same here.
And I am not trying to come across as a fan boy type but my Amsec BF has been everything I could have asked for in a quality gun safe.
Hell it will probably be passed down to a grand child one day as it isn't likely it will self destruct.
Still it will be interesting to find out what exactly was the problem.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v627/a1abdj/AMSECBF6030damage03_zpsrykzhinu.jpg

As a Manufacturer you would think that AMSEC would favor the one-off mishap of "explosion by overfill" to the cold fact the the BF disintegrates when the door is shut hard. This de-lamination upon impact theory does not explain the expansion upward of the top surface of that door interface (above photo). Consequently it was that area that seemed to cause the jammed door in the first place. How does that happen on a slammed door? I assume the contact surfaces are the back-face of the plate door and the front face of the door jam. How did the offending metal expand above the contact face without some outward (upward in this case) force? If the contact area is not as I described,  then it must be the flat face area just below, and perpendicular, to the door seal, which is obvious comprised of very light gauge folded steel filled with composite material.

I wonder how AMSEC designed that BF internal door structure? What kind of forces were calculated into the model?  There was a  catastrophic reaction within that safe, and this thing was not dropped from 20 ft. Whatever (alleged)  external force caused that malfunction  is very well within the normal operating environment. Doors get slammed. If there was enough steel and weld in that assembly it would not have failed.

One more thought on edit, from a purely technical perspective: If this design so easily crushes by slamming the door then a perfect attack vector would be to sledge or jackhammer the door inward to crush the sheet metal and dry-lite door assembly to gain clearance for a pry attack. I'm glad I don't own one of these Bfs if the final word from AMSEC is slamming failure.

Yours truly is the designer. I am the guilty party. I would agree, if this was an endemic issue, it should (and would) be corrected. However, the BF gunsafe line and a similar home safe line built on the same construction has been in production for about 17 years now, probably half a million units sold. In that time, this has never been a service issue. As far as I know, this is the first time anyone has reported this sort of damage.

Let me ask you a simple question.

If you slammed the door of your 5-year old car hard enough to explode the window or detach the door liner, and you know you can do that with enough effort, would you expect the car dealer to repair that damage under your warranty (which expired 2 years ago)?

I'm sure they would laugh a bit and politely tell you to take a hike. They too would have no hard evidence that you caused the damage, but you know that trying to get the dealer to fix it would be a futile effort.

How is that case any different?

On your point:

This de-lamination upon impact theory does not explain the expansion upward of the top surface of that door interface

I explained that already, but it seems my long technical posts are not getting read. I skip over long wordy posts in threads too, so don't feel bad.

Let's answer this with a question too...

If you jump on a cardboard box, what happens to the side walls of the box?

The mostly bulge out, right?

Same effect here. The door pan is a box, and if you compress the box, the materials buckle and push in or out. With the fill on the inside, it can't buckle inward, so it must buckle outward.

What happens to the corners of the box? They generally split and tear open, just like the corner of the door pan you see in the photos.

Make sense?

Exactly

Joking aside Its just as implausible that the door pan could crush if it was filled properly with dri-fill (cement). There had to be air pockets in order for that 5000-50,000 psi concrete to crush. And if there was air pockets existing from the original pour, then that air could have been in compression that later manifest as expansion and burst.

Out of curiosity. How do you fill those walls? under vacuum?

If not what measures do you take to guarantee that  you do non trap compressed air?

In my industry when we want to make sure a fluid completely fills a cavity with no air, we pull a vacuum and then pump in the fluid.

Maybe this video will help some visualize how a properly filled real steel safe will perform when subjected to an external force, as opposed to one that is hollow and light gauge steel. Notice on the second safe the door still opens.

I'd like to see the door slam that would demolish that second safe.

Safe video

The DryLite fill is not high strength concrete, and we never claimed it was strong or very dense. I have been candid on that point in other threads. It is an insulating material, with the consistency of pumice. It is based on Concrete as a binder, but with a controlled matrix of very small air pockets and other non-structural ingredients. You can crush a chunk of this stuff in your hand. It's a reactive fire barrier, not a burglary defense barrier. Along an edge, it could easily crush 1/8 inch or so to produce the buckled edges you see.

The filling process is proprietary, so I can't tell you how we do it, but rest assured there are no unfilled cavities. Part of making a filled safe is learning how to fill it completely, and that takes design and experimental development I can't share.

edit: The door and body are not air-tight. They are intentionally fabricated that way, but I won't explain why. Again, proprietary information.

In my industry, we fill a wide variety of safes with a host of various proprietary mix designs from DryLite to 16,000 psi reinforced concrete. If you didn't know it, we make rated fire safes and "composite" safes with UL listings in a wide range of ratings.. We know how to fill a safe.

...

Why are so many people so invested in the outcome of this thread? Besides entertainment it really serves no other purpose. What conclusion is going to be found if there are two sides and everyone is sticking to them?

It doesn't take an engineer to understand that damage isn't/wasn't a product defect or caused by the insulator expanding inside the steel door. Some of you people have very wild imaginations, but unfortunately they aren't grounded in reality, or the laws of physics. Just like The Safe Guy explained in his very appropriate analogy; if you take your car back to the dealer with cosmetic collision damage you are going to have a tough time arguing that it just "happened" all by itself.

I suppose the cement insulator could be responsible for any cosmetic damages around anyone's BF safe based on the fallacious logic laid out in this thread...

[insert picture of sturdy safe door gap and card]

I think they are on a witch hunt...seems like you can only appreciate one safe brand and many here cheerlead for Sturdy so they need to try and bash Amsec

I think renotse has a very specific ax to grind. I am not sure yet as the maker or pattern of ax he is trying to grind though, but im sure it will come to light soon or he will be banned. If this were the reloading forum, dryflash would have laid the hammer down already, whispering "good night sweet prince" is his ear while the e-life drained from his pupils.

With that being said, i am interested in more detailed analysis. Usually if the company suspects something is wrong on their end like a design flaw, they will get the safe back for "analysis" then throw it in the pile out back and tell you the investigation was inconclusive and you will notice it when you are there for a training event 6 months later, untouched, laying in the rain.

I'm a dealer for several multinational conglomerates in a different industry. Multibillion dollar global leaders in their field and i don't think this is as nearly as big of a deal as others that are being finicky. Ive been put through the ringer during my career on warranty, over a million dollars worth. One of them evem changed their warranty policy recently to a "dont answer dont pay policy." They simply send you to a dead voicemail every time so you cant file a claim. I havent been able to talk to warranty in 6 months and i know the head of the dept personally. When i confront the regional managers about it they smirk and say my phone must be broken and not connecting to voicemail.

Gun owners are a demanding clientele.

You mean like this one? Sorry I only had a picture with three cards

For the record, I agree with TSG. It appears the damage is physical in nature but I won't speculate what caused it but TSGs explanation makes sense to me. As to Sturdy 'fanboys' bashing AMSEC on this thread, I guess that would be me and I'm guilty; however, my attack isn't personal against TSG and I have never made a personal attack against him although I don't think he can say the same. Recall that AMSEC has gone to great lengths purchasing, testing, even developing their own testing standard (a highly questionable standard as seen by the results of testing) to show how their product is superior to competitors including Sturdy so if anyone around here has been throwing mud it's been AMSEC/TSG and their fanboys. In light of the recent attacks against them, I also don't blame Sturdy for making a video comparing their design to a competitor's design to show how much more robust it is in comparison and Sturdy has said and i paraphrase ' ... you can slam our safe doors as much as you want for a lifetime and not have a problem ... ' In my non 'safe expert' opinion and feel free to correct me if I'm wrong TSG, the purpose of the thin sheet used for the door pan of Drylight is to limit the path of heat conduction from the door in the case of a fire. This design choice is a strength in a fire but a weakness in the case of some physical high stress event.

It's the first time I have seen this sort of damage as well.  But it's not the first time I have seen safes abused, slammed, dropped, pried on, or otherwise.  And this safe displays absolutely no other signs that any of these things have happened.  I even witnessed a BF7240 fall backwards off of a dock high truck and landing on concrete.  One would think that the forces in that situation were far greater than a door slamming, yet it displayed none of the damage this safe did.




Indeed.  So if that were the case, we could also expect to see collateral damage, correct?  Paint chipping?  Door seals crushed?  Damage to the body of the safe where the door was striking it?  Or even:



The disintegration of the fill material as seen through the opening of that pan?  If it can be crumbled in your hand (it can, I've held it), then surely it would be disturbed by slamming a door so hard that it deformed steel.  However, I can see no signs that the exposed fill material has been disturbed in any way.  No dust, or bits or pieces loose.  What I can see through the crack looks 100% intact.

I have to move some stuff in that building later today.  I'll get some additional photos while I'm out there.