Quoted:
And just how are they going to regulate that. It's a disk of rubber or rubber like substance. Fuck off ATF.

Quoted:
So my question is if you have a Dead Air Ghost and have the Dead Air wipes is it still "legal" in the eyes of the ATF to use them.  I know Dead Air is suppose to stop production and sales of them but what about those that have purchased (Ghost did come with a few wipes) are we expected to dispose of them.  

Also, if the wipes were to be used in a self defense situation could the use of wipes be used against you in court.  This question is because the Ghost in short config with a wipe on a 9mm would be a great bedside combo.

Quoted:
And just how are they going to regulate that. It's a disk of rubber or rubber like substance. Fuck off ATF.

Quoted:

It's a silencer part. You can still have them. Dead Air just can't sell you spares.

Quoted:


Ok, makes sense I just wanted to see if they were viewed as "spare/extra" silencer parts.  The wipes were a good concept to try and bring back for suppressors and I was curious to see if other companies would implement them in their products but quess this stops that idea.

Also, makes me wonder how much crediblity is in the "ATF Whitepapers Leaked" post because if the ATF viewed unrestricted citizen ownership of suppressors so openly then why are they waisting time on banning rubber gaskets.

ATF White Papers post

Although Dodson’s good-faith-reliance argument—or as it is usually called, “entrapment by estoppel”—is conceptually a viable defense, he fails to demonstrate any of its requirements. The “entrapment by estoppel” defense is available where 1) a government official announced that the charged criminal act was legal; 2) the defendant relied on that statement; 3) the defendant’s reliance was reasonable; and, 4) given the defendant’s reliance, prosecution would be unfair. United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1992). Here, Dodson relies on an investigative report of ATF agent Michael Powell, along with vague allegations that the ATF and federal prosecutors “misinterpreted” the ruling for years.6 The Powell report closed an investigation for lack of prosecutorial potential, based on Powell’s inability to determine the date of manufacture of certain auto sears. The report explained that “AR15 drop-in auto sears manufactured prior to November 1, 1981 are not subject to regulation under the National Firearms Act.” This report is not sufficient to meet any of the necessary entrapment-by-estoppel elements. First, although the report suggests that auto sears may be exempt from the provisions of the National Firearms Act, it does not affirmatively state that possession of auto sears is legal under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). Second, there is no evidence that Dodson was aware of this report, which was prepared in 2007 for an investigation in Texas. In addition, Dodson had been selling his auto sears for many years before this investigation—it does not appear that the report changed his behavior in any way. Third, even if he had read the report, it was not reasonable for Dodson to rely on the statements of an ATF field agent in an investigative context for conclusive determinations of law. Agent Powell was not a lawyer, nor was he intending to provide legal guidance to the general public. Fourth, it is not even clear that prosecution would have been unfair. Dodson was aware he was selling dangerous, heavily regulated items to unknown individuals, but continued to take advantage of a narrow technicality for over thirty years without obtaining any formal opinion from the ATF. Given the weakness of his entrapment-by-estoppel
defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider such a defense at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Walker, 450 F. App’x 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting equitable- estoppel challenge to sentencing determination due to lack of affirmative misconduct by the government); see also Lemons, 480 F. App’x at 400 (rejecting possibility of “partial” entrapment-by- estoppel defense).