41 photos
Nearly twenty-five years ago, the Soviet Union pulled its last troops out of Afghanistan, ending more than nine years of direct involvement and occupation. The USSR entered neighboring Afghanistan in 1979, attempting to shore up the newly-established pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.
http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/


interesting photos

we should of learned form them.

I'd say we did since we did essentially the exact opposite of what they did.

I found it interesting how much Soviet memorabilia still existed on our (formerly their) bases like Bagram and Kandahar Air Field.

In addition to the vehicles and vehicle parts and all sorts of weapons which were relatively easily returned to operational status, there was essentially everything else associated with life on the FOB (uniforms, coffee cups, medical instruments, bottles, cans, etc.).  While every splinter of wood had been scavenged (for fuel) everything else was lying around if you knew were to look.

Interesting pictures, thanks for posting.

Thanks for the link, flash.

That war is a textbook-worthy example of how not to run a counterinsurgency. They lost the moment they set foot in the country.

The Soviets had something close to a 50% casualty rate due to disease. Compare that to a 25% rate for the US in Vietnam. Afghanistan's not the easiest climate in which an army needs to operate, but the jungle is far more challenging. Most of the diseases the Soviets encountered were from a lack of basic sanitation practices- Hep A, typhus, cholera, and others.

For some operational and tactical perspective, read Lester Grau's The Bear Went Over the Mountain and The Other Side of the Mountain. I found copies of both as .pdf's and found the latter- perspective from the Muj- to be far more interesting. There's a .pdf available for free download that dispels just about every myth about the Stinger missile entitled The Stinger Missile and US Intervention in Afghanistan. In short, the Stinger was a minor irritation to the Russians, and they were quick to develop very effective countermeasures.

More than any other cause, it was this war that played the biggest role in the downfall of the Soviet Union. For that, I am thankful.

I found an interesting related book, Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, a RAND study from 1988.  It contains a lot of anecdotal evidence of the collapse of Soviet operations there and the unpopularity of that war.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3627.html

Some of their conclusions:

"The report examines and addresses at length the major factors that have a negative effect on morale and discipline:

* Indoctrination. Given the emphasis on political indoctrination in the Soviet army, psychological preparation and motivation of the troops for service in Afghanistan is surprisingly poor and possibly even counterproductive.

* Personnel relations. The traditional antagonistic relationship between first- and second-year soldiers has become even more pronounced under the conditions of war and serves to undermine unit cohesion and discipline, especially in the occupation forces. Personnel conflicts of an ethnic nature, particularly between Soviet Muslims and the Slavic majority, are also a continuing problem.

* Drugs and alcohol. Drug usage has become widespread; more than 50 percent of Soviet personnel are said to be regular users. Apart from its direct impact on military performance, drug abuse is likely to have a negative long-term effect on Soviet society.

* Quality of life. Extremely poor hygiene, inadequate living conditions, and isolation contribute to serious health and morale problems.

* Atrocities and looting. Officially sanctioned reprisals and brutality against the civilian population in contravention to internationally accepted norms of warfare conduct are common. "Freelance" looting and atrocities, however, are strongly discouraged, and those who engage in them are punished severely.

* Theft and corruption. Theft, black-market activities, and smuggling are widespread throughout the Soviet armed forces." (pp. vi-vii)

I'd say it wa a mix.  We have both been obsessed with a creating a Kabul-based state with strong central authority.  We both have also let ideology trump practicality.

Interestingly, the stuff they fucked up the most is the kind of stuff many of the know-it-all blow-hard types here say we also should have been doing - i.e. declaring an al-out war on Islam, harsh reprisals agaisnt civilian populations, etc.

The former is particularly puzzling, as that was contrary ot their own lessons learned fighting in Central Asia the generation prior.  Heck, the first waves of Soviet troops were Muslim.  But, Communist ideology seems to have flared up at odd times and with different degrees of emphasis in Soviet history - in Afghanistan, the Soviets started to panic and fear the Afghan version of Islam would spread north... a fear that hasn't exactly gone away to date.

Fantastic. Thanks for the link.

It's staggering how much of the muj weaponry was simply bought from the Soviets in Kabul bazaars who knew full well where the were going and that their "comrades" were guaranteed to be on the receiving end of bullets and rockets from those very weapons. Most of the Afghan government forces were at least sympathetic to the mujahideen and ambivalent at best to the Soviets. One can guess how effective they were.