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Posted: 7/12/2014 1:55:13 AM EDT
Today, we will examine the Sicily airdrops by the 82nd Airborne Division through the eyes of an officer tasked to make a report directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1943.  Lt Col C. Billingslea pulled no punches in this report. He first addresses shortcomings in training, organization, and staff work, then gets into the heart of the matter.

SUBJECT: Report of Airborne Operations, "Husky" and "Bigot".

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/4021/rec/8

Allied landings map, including planned 82nd Abn DZs:




Skipping over the organization and training, which you can read at your leisure, we will look at the operations for the drop of the 505th RCT.

"a.  The timing of the operation from an Airborne point of view was poor. The quarter moon on the 9th-10th gave very little light. Moonlight was not satisfactory until the 13th or 14th. In addition the drop was so timed that the last units dropping had only a matter of minutes to assemble before moonset.  Any delay in the drop or of the flight, which proved to be the case, meant dropping and assembling in darkness, an operation proven very unsatisfactory in training tests with the 2d Bn, 509th Prcht Regt.

b. There was no countersign or parole for the entire task force. Each Division had its own set of passwords. The 505th CT was briefed only on the mission of the 1st Division. Amphibian units other than the 1st Division were not conversant with the parachute operations and were not familiar with the parachute uniform.  This lack of coordination later resulted in casualties to both parachute regiments."

Report, pp. 8-9

"26. T.C. {Troop Carrier} Operation. The takeoff was well conducted. By dusk the planes were Airborne and formations started flying their course for Sicily. After dark, a heavy wind arose, flying was rough and men became airsick. No correction for the new weather conditions was made and formations began drifting off course. Difficulties became evident at Malta when many planes missed this important check point.

a. Some pilots lost their elements and went alone. Several joined British formations and followed them to the east coast of Sicily. Over the beaches flack further distracted the pilots and the final drop resulted in units scattered from Gela to the east coast of Sicily...The center of gravity of the Regiment was in the VITTORIA, SANTA CRECE area about 30 miles from the proposed DZ. This area lay in the 45th Division sector.

27. Conclusions. Many causes contributed to poor drops, the most important of which are the following:

a. Inadequate training especially along aerial operational lines.

b. An unnecessarily long and complicated course with poor cooperation by the Navy small craft.

c. Very few pilots or commanders were flown over the DZs in combat planes to study the terrain before the operation began even though countless flights were made over the area daily.

d. Meteorological data was incomplete. No reports came from ships in the target area.

e. Medium bombers familiar with the terrain of Sicily were not employed as guides in any formations, nor was the radar used or a Scout company dropped.

f.  Pilots were too dependent on lead ships. They were given only overlays, no air photographs. Insufficient navigators proved costly.

g.  Close proximity of American and British Formations mixed some units, particularly when their takeoff fields were so close and times of takeoff identical.

h. Flying V of Vs made formation difficult for wing planes.

i. Pilots were not seasoned to operating in flack. Some attempted evasive action on approach to DZ."

Report, pp. 9-10

Next, he looks at the 504th CT airdrop, which was also equally costly.

"29. 504th CT Operations. Due to the obscure situation of the 505th CT during D day, the drop of the 504th CT was delayed from D plus 1 night to the night of D plus 1 - D plus 2. The battalion was ordered by the 82d A/B Division to drop on a DZ near GELA, assemble, and be prepared to act as ground infantry.

a.  The decision to mount the 504th operation was not reached until the day of the operation itself. Allowance was not made for the time required to inform all shipping and shore batteries of the impending flight. Ground units beyond the 1st Division area knew nothing of the operation. The 504th CT was not familiar with the situation or countersign of units on the flanks of the 1st Division area. Once again coordination between Air, Ground and Navy was poor and cost many lives.

b. The takeoff and route to SICILY were as planned for the 505th CT. Although high winds were not encountered on this second trip, the same complications arose. Some formations missed MALTA, planes lost their leaders and a few followed the British.

c. Approaching the coast matters grew worse. Heavy AA fire was encountered from Allied ships and shore batteries. Over thirty planes were lost and more damaged. Planes forced down near the coast were machine gunned by shore parties as paratroops attempted to launch rubber boats.

d. The drop had the same pattern as that of the 505th CT. Units scattered from GELA to the east coast of SICILY.  After landing, the paratroops in the 45th Division area were fired upon by ground units. Road blocks were alerted to watch for German parachutists and brisk fights started between Airborne and ground troops. Even the 1st Division in whose area the drop was supposed to take place, carried the 504th CT as an identified German Parachute Regiment in its G-2 Report.

e. As a result, the 504th CT, on an administrative move to our own rear area, suffered casualties in excess of many of the units in combat at that time."

Report, pp. 11-12
Link Posted: 8/10/2014 6:19:26 AM EDT
[#1]
that operation could have easily been a disaster...

to paraphrase one recommendation I found interesting:

"airborne troops should not be dropped behind their own lines"

the report also went into detail about the problems with unassigned/replacement troops - it does not seem many of those findings were addressed by Normandy...
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