Honestly - and I think Jake may recall - my reaction in the room as it was happening was the same as what you wrote below, and what Ben related. That she says no backdoor, which is good, but then says we need a way in, and then the bad line about not understanding technology. The latter two points make the first one seem vulnerable.  But in terms of wanting a way to break in - couldn't we tell tech off the record that she had in mind the malware/key strokes idea (insert malware into a device that you know is a target, to capture keystrokes before they are encrypted). Or that she had in mind really super code breaking by the NSA. But not the backdoor per se?  I don't understand why the Manhattan project or Bletchley park are bad references? Just seems very dated?  On Dec 20, 2015, at 7:49 PM, Teddy Goff <[email protected]> wrote:  adding john too, a fellow crypto hobbyist. (john may be something more than a hobbyist.)  i think it was fine, a solid B/B+. john tells me that he has actually heard nice things from friends of ours in SV, which is rare! i do think that "i would not want to go to that point" got overshadowed in some circles by the "some way to break in" thing -- which does seem to portend some sort of mandate or other anti-encryption policy, and also reinforces the the ideological gap -- and then, more atmospherically, by the manhattan project analogy (which we truly, truly should not make ever again -- can we work on pressing that point somehow?) and the cringe-y "i don't understand all the technology" line, which i also think does not help and we should avoid saying going forward.  speaking of not understanding the technology, there is a critical technical point which our current language around encryption makes plain she isn't aware of. open-source unencrypted messaging technologies are in the public domain. there is literally no way to put that genie back in the bottle. so we can try to compel a whatsapp to unencrypt, but that may only have the effect of pushing terrorists onto emergent encrypted platforms.  i do think going forward it will be helpful to be able to refer to her having pledged not to mandate a backdoor as president. but we've got to iron out the rest of the message. i actually do believe there is a way to thread the needle here, which i am happy to discuss; it requires us to quickly pivot from encryption to the broader issue of working with tech companies to detect and stop these people, and not getting into the weeds of which app they happen to use and that sort of thing.  On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 8:58 AM, Sara Solow <[email protected]> wrote: