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Link Posted: 4/1/2015 11:14:00 PM EDT
[#1]
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The discussion was use of the MG in the attack.  Your second picture is Feb 1944, while Burgett was describing fighting in Dec 1944-Jan 1945.  That is a picture of an M1919A4, not an M1919A6.  The A6 had no tripod, but a fixed buttstock and bipod.  Somewhere that year the A4 was phased out.

In Burgett's account, a two man team bounded, firing the A6 off the bipod, while riflemen bounded up alongside it in regular frontal fire and movement.  He was specifically referring to a frontal assault in the Bois Jacques, near Bastogne.  I thought it was pertinent because that was a very close equivalent to German TO&E, at least for a US unit.  Because the MG was in the rifle squad they maneuvered forward with it.

IIRC in his first book Burgett mentioned being in Normandy and seeing infantry walking by with BARs, and saying he was glad the paratroops didnt have them.  HE didnt think the firepower was worth the bulk and weight.
Link Posted: 4/1/2015 11:17:18 PM EDT
[#2]
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Quoted:

Often, 60mm teams are attached to PLTs and are under control of the PLT commander. When that isn't the case, Assaultmen bring SMAWs to the PLT, helping to bridge the HE gap. Newer weapon systems, such as the M32, also help.
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I would commend "Doctrine and Dogma" as a book, if you havent seen it.  The Germans in WWI tried to synchronize direct and indirect fires at every level in the offense, something we have failed to do.  A grenade launcher at squad level, lightweight mortar at platoon, heavier mortar pus perhaps an assault gun at company and increase as you go, seeking to synchronize an indirect HE chucker with an automatic weapon.  I think a handheld 60mm in a weapon squad is a prerequisite and an unconsidered shortcoming, especially with prox rounds and bad guys who are too stupid to build overhead cover.  For that matter, we could saw off our mortars and shirten the range and use them to get prox munitions into the fight more.  That is a function of the stormtroopers in the offense that should be more influential then it was.

Great posts though.
That sounds like the entire combined arms doctrine of the Marine Corps.
 


Actually no, it wasnt at all.  It wasnt necessarily that of the US Army either, but I'm not trying to be parochial.

The nature of the German tactics  was to create the complementary forces that puts the defender on the horns of a dillemma.  That is basic tactics, and yes, part of USMC doctrine.  And Army.

Most of the time we do it with a SBF that emplaces frontal fire, and a maneuver force that comes from the flank.  If you keep your head down to not get shot by the SBF, the assault forc overruns you. Get up to repel the assault force and you get hit by the SBF. The dillemma is generaly delivered by attacks from two directions.

Bad tactics, like Japanese tactics, is to do a frontal banzai charge with no SBF.  There is no dillemma, it is simply return fire and defeat the attack.

The Germans in WWI sorta couldnt necessarily outflank the enemy all that often, so the dillemma they created was direct and indirect fires.  Grenade launchers at squad level, light weight mortars at platoon.

The Marines in WWII had rifle grenade launchers at squad level, and phased them out.  60mm mortars were a company asset the Platoon commander didnt have.  The Army kept the grenade launchers but used 60mms the same as the USMC.

The big USMC intiatives, as everyone knows, is larger sqauds with three teams and triple the BARs. Which is great, but there was no indirect weapon at platoon or below.  


The trend in the US is to not carry lightweight HE launchers but bring a radio and trust you can get the support from higher. In theory you can be more mobile as you can call for a 105mm rather then hump a 60mm, or 50mm like the Germans had for a little while.  In practice you get the firepower and the mobility but trade away the authority because the PL doesnt own those fires.  My point is the US creates those dillemmas between indirect and direct fire, but NOT at all levels.  Generally at fire team, with 203s, and company, with 60mms, but in between there isnt an asset that SLs and PLs control and own organically.


As to why you should do it that way, as opposed to have mortars at CO level and task them down:  There isnt a good reason if you have the proper weapons.  IMHO the mortar used at company level as the commander's pocket artillery is bulkier then it need to be and a lighter version with less weight and shorter range would be useful in a weapons squad.

You may disagree, but I notice in US discussions the chief debate is over precision rifle vs automatic fie and what is the proper mix, and HE is something conceded to be on the other end of the radio.  Which is fine, and may work the best; but in WWI the German tactics were the lower you could sync it the better, and that was preferable to more firepower synced at a higher level.  Then again, that was the pre-radio era, but still, an interesting observation.

Often, 60mm teams are attached to PLTs and are under control of the PLT commander. When that isn't the case, Assaultmen bring SMAWs to the PLT, helping to bridge the HE gap. Newer weapon systems, such as the M32, also help.


Fair enough.  I was referring to WW II USMC MTO&E as we were talking about Germans.  Technically SMAWs aren't indirect, and 60s arent organic.
Link Posted: 4/1/2015 11:24:22 PM EDT
[#3]
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Quoted:
Subscribed for more sober reading.
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This.
Also in before LRRPF52?
Link Posted: 4/1/2015 11:37:33 PM EDT
[#4]
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Quoted:


The discussion was use of the MG in the attack.  Your second picture is Feb 1944, while Burgett was describing fighting in Dec 1944-Jan 1945.  That is a picture of an M1919A4, not an M1919A6.  The A6 had no tripod, but a fixed buttstock and bipod.  Somewhere that year the A4 was phased out.

In Burgett's account, a two man team bounded, firing the A6 off the bipod, while riflemen bounded up alongside it in regular frontal fire and movement.  He was specifically referring to a frontal assault in the Bois Jacques, near Bastogne.  I thought it was pertinent because that was a very close equivalent to German TO&E, at least for a US unit.  Because the MG was in the rifle squad they maneuvered forward with it.

IIRC in his first book Burgett mentioned being in Normandy and seeing infantry walking by with BARs, and saying he was glad the paratroops didnt have them.  HE didnt think the firepower was worth the bulk and weight.
View Quote View All Quotes
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Discussion ForumsJump to Quoted PostQuote History
Quoted:


The discussion was use of the MG in the attack.  Your second picture is Feb 1944, while Burgett was describing fighting in Dec 1944-Jan 1945.  That is a picture of an M1919A4, not an M1919A6.  The A6 had no tripod, but a fixed buttstock and bipod.  Somewhere that year the A4 was phased out.

In Burgett's account, a two man team bounded, firing the A6 off the bipod, while riflemen bounded up alongside it in regular frontal fire and movement.  He was specifically referring to a frontal assault in the Bois Jacques, near Bastogne.  I thought it was pertinent because that was a very close equivalent to German TO&E, at least for a US unit.  Because the MG was in the rifle squad they maneuvered forward with it.

IIRC in his first book Burgett mentioned being in Normandy and seeing infantry walking by with BARs, and saying he was glad the paratroops didnt have them.  HE didnt think the firepower was worth the bulk and weight.


I might add that including the LMG into the parachute squads (of the 505th PIR) was similar only in equipment, not doctrine, of the Germans. The US used it as a SAW, to augment the firepower of the squad but the squad did not revolve around the gun the same way as the Germans did. Probably because the Americans weren't on the defensive for the most part, which changes tactics and organization. Plus cultural differences.

To repeat, given how the paratroopers used both the 1919 and 1919A6, I don't see how giving them a 50 lb lafette type tripod and periscope would have helped them much in the battles they fought in.
Link Posted: 4/1/2015 11:46:13 PM EDT
[#5]
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Quoted:


Fair enough.  I was referring to WW II USMC MTO&E as we were talking about Germans.  Technically SMAWs aren't indirect, and 60s arent organic.
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Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
Quoted:
snip
I would commend "Doctrine and Dogma" as a book, if you havent seen it.  The Germans in WWI tried to synchronize direct and indirect fires at every level in the offense, something we have failed to do.  A grenade launcher at squad level, lightweight mortar at platoon, heavier mortar pus perhaps an assault gun at company and increase as you go, seeking to synchronize an indirect HE chucker with an automatic weapon.  I think a handheld 60mm in a weapon squad is a prerequisite and an unconsidered shortcoming, especially with prox rounds and bad guys who are too stupid to build overhead cover.  For that matter, we could saw off our mortars and shirten the range and use them to get prox munitions into the fight more.  That is a function of the stormtroopers in the offense that should be more influential then it was.

Great posts though.
That sounds like the entire combined arms doctrine of the Marine Corps.
 


Actually no, it wasnt at all.  It wasnt necessarily that of the US Army either, but I'm not trying to be parochial.

The nature of the German tactics  was to create the complementary forces that puts the defender on the horns of a dillemma.  That is basic tactics, and yes, part of USMC doctrine.  And Army.

Most of the time we do it with a SBF that emplaces frontal fire, and a maneuver force that comes from the flank.  If you keep your head down to not get shot by the SBF, the assault forc overruns you. Get up to repel the assault force and you get hit by the SBF. The dillemma is generaly delivered by attacks from two directions.

Bad tactics, like Japanese tactics, is to do a frontal banzai charge with no SBF.  There is no dillemma, it is simply return fire and defeat the attack.

The Germans in WWI sorta couldnt necessarily outflank the enemy all that often, so the dillemma they created was direct and indirect fires.  Grenade launchers at squad level, light weight mortars at platoon.

The Marines in WWII had rifle grenade launchers at squad level, and phased them out.  60mm mortars were a company asset the Platoon commander didnt have.  The Army kept the grenade launchers but used 60mms the same as the USMC.

The big USMC intiatives, as everyone knows, is larger sqauds with three teams and triple the BARs. Which is great, but there was no indirect weapon at platoon or below.  


The trend in the US is to not carry lightweight HE launchers but bring a radio and trust you can get the support from higher. In theory you can be more mobile as you can call for a 105mm rather then hump a 60mm, or 50mm like the Germans had for a little while.  In practice you get the firepower and the mobility but trade away the authority because the PL doesnt own those fires.  My point is the US creates those dillemmas between indirect and direct fire, but NOT at all levels.  Generally at fire team, with 203s, and company, with 60mms, but in between there isnt an asset that SLs and PLs control and own organically.


As to why you should do it that way, as opposed to have mortars at CO level and task them down:  There isnt a good reason if you have the proper weapons.  IMHO the mortar used at company level as the commander's pocket artillery is bulkier then it need to be and a lighter version with less weight and shorter range would be useful in a weapons squad.

You may disagree, but I notice in US discussions the chief debate is over precision rifle vs automatic fie and what is the proper mix, and HE is something conceded to be on the other end of the radio.  Which is fine, and may work the best; but in WWI the German tactics were the lower you could sync it the better, and that was preferable to more firepower synced at a higher level.  Then again, that was the pre-radio era, but still, an interesting observation.

Often, 60mm teams are attached to PLTs and are under control of the PLT commander. When that isn't the case, Assaultmen bring SMAWs to the PLT, helping to bridge the HE gap. Newer weapon systems, such as the M32, also help.


Fair enough.  I was referring to WW II USMC MTO&E as we were talking about Germans.  Technically SMAWs aren't indirect, and 60s arent organic.


Rarely in WWII would a USMC rifle platoon be operating alone, away from its parent company, or even battalion. This meant company and battalion level.mortars, as well as heavy guns from the weapons company, could be pushed down to support what ever main effort unit was in need of them. It the German case, especially with their lack of comma issues, it makes more sense to put the 50mm mortars under company control to coordinate fires. Better to have three mortars working together to support the company objective, rather than three mortars working separately hundreds of meters away from their own platoon leaders (in platoon attack situations the platoon mortars wouldn't keep up with the advance obviously).

The idea only works well when the platoon doesn't need to move quickly in contact, like in a defensive position. But even then, single platoons arely defend anything alone, and should they be isolated, supporting units like extra machine gun teams or mortars can always be attached to them.
Link Posted: 4/2/2015 12:20:51 AM EDT
[#6]
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Rarely in WWII would a USMC rifle platoon be operating alone, away from its parent company, or even battalion. This meant company and battalion level.mortars, as well as heavy guns from the weapons company, could be pushed down to support what ever main effort unit was in need of them. It the German case, especially with their lack of comma issues, it makes more sense to put the 50mm mortars under company control to coordinate fires. Better to have three mortars working together to support the company objective, rather than three mortars working separately hundreds of meters away from their own platoon leaders (in platoon attack situations the platoon mortars wouldn't keep up with the advance obviously).

The idea only works well when the platoon doesn't need to move quickly in contact, like in a defensive position. But even then, single platoons arely defend anything alone, and should they be isolated, supporting units like extra machine gun teams or mortars can always be attached to them.
View Quote


I'm not saying one is better than the other, I am saying here is something that shows a different approach.

I would say the US system was synchronization at company, mostly battalion and higher.  PLs asked for support and needed permission, as they didnt "own" stuff.

Germans "owned" their own stuff but what they owned was pretty ineffective.

US had more firepower on call and could travel light as they werent lugging around mortars at platoon level, usually.  They just carried a radio and called for it.

I would disagree with you in that the US systems works better most of the time, almost all the time.  The German system works if you arentthe main effort, and cant get assets from higher. Then having your own piece of something is good. Decentralized stuff works better if the most important factor is speed, and comms is weak, and speed is worth more than the issues of carrying a relatively small piece of firepower.  The Japanese also used lightweight mortars extensively in their patrols, and in the jungle that was considered an advantage for them.  Just throwing out examples.

Lugging around a 60mm or M32 is great if your supporting fires are unresponsive due to where you are or what the ROE is.  If I was a US unit attacking dug in conventional infantry, carry rifle and MG ammo and use tube artillery.
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