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The thread about the Fulda Gap has me wondering:  What equipment would've each side had in the mid-70s?  I know that the M60 would've been our MBT and the T72 theirs probably, but what about APC (M113 v. BMP or BTR?), rotary and fixed wing (Cobra v. Hind? no idea on fixed), artillery (no clue), etc?  I suppose Huey and Mi8 would've been the mules of the air still.  Were there a lot of M48s and T55 or 64 around?  What CAS aircraft were there for each side since the A10 and SU25 weren't yet operational, correct?  This is all conventional, of course.  CBRN is a completely different matter.  I was born in '81 so by the time I could care about such things we had Apaches, A10s, F15/16s, and Abrams everywhere.

ETA: if you have a link that's a good resource for me to check out I'd love to have it.  Thanks!

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I was an Infantry Lt in Germany from 1978-1981.   My first platoon only had 17 men.  This was pre Reagan and our equipment was not the best.  

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At least every one of our tanks and APCs would have a radio-IIRC, many Soviet mech units only had comms at platoon or  even company level.

"The Soviet armed forces: the tank company on the attack

One of the most important pieces of equipment of the ground forces in the Soviet-Union is the tank. Even today it is still the offensive arm par excellence. The Soviet-Union has large numbers of tanks, which can categorised in various types such as: T-55, T-62, T-64 and T-72. Tank units generally operate closely with mechanised infantry units. The strength of a tank company (the Soviets speak of a company instead of a squadron) is 10 tanks. However in the event a tank company belongs to the tank bataljon of a mechanised infantry regiment the strength is 13 tanks. The Russian tanks are compact, roughly finished and have an excellent main gun. The optics however are not yet as modern as those of Western tanks.

Organisation

A tank company consists of three platoons of each three tanks and a company staff, which has the commander's tank (The tank company of 13 tanks has four tanks in each platoon). The commander of the company is a senior lieutenant or a captain. He is aided by two officers in the rank of junior lieutenant or lieutenant. One of these is second in command regarding political matters, the other is second in command regarding technical matters. In addition the company has ofcourse a CSM (starshina roty), and administrator etc. The platoon commanders are usually junior officers, though this function can occcasionally be filled by a sergeant or sergant-major.

Armament and equipment

A tank company disposes of the following equipment:
10x medium tank
1x truck (ZIL)
12x automatic weapon AKM or AK74
33x pistol 9mm

- Every tank has a schnorkel kit, which enables wading through water obstacles up to a depth of five meters.
- The number of crewmen could be reduced in the newer tanks by placing an autoloader in the turret.
- All tanks can carry two drums with each 200 liters of fuel on the rear deck, which can be jettisoned just before combat is joined.
- Every tank can lay a smoke screen by injecting fuel into the hot exhaust. In addition newer tanks have been provided with smoke grenade launchers.

Tactics

On the lower levels with regard to the Soviets we ought to speak of combat drills rather than tactics. The actions that a tank company needs to take in case an attack is launched are in sequential order:
- actions in the assembly area (getting ready for combat)
- the tactical movement towards the area where the company must execute the attack
- the deployment into platoon columns at around a kilometer in front of the defending party
- breaching of any obstacles present
- attacking the forward edge of the defence
- breaching the defence
- continuation of the attack in the depth of the defence out to a depth of about two to five kilometers

The preparations in the assembly area and the subsequent movement generally cannot be observed from defensive positions. Any data on these originate from for example airial reconnaissance. The breaching of obstacles however can usually be observed directly, for obstacles are always placed under observation and covered by fire. In that manner it may be seen how mine breaching devices can be attached to tanks to clear any mines present. This usually concerns the KMT-4 or KMT-5, respectively a mine plow and a combined mine plow and - roller. Against other types of obstacles a dozerblade may be attached to the tank.

Deployment

Before these kinds of action begin, that is before any contact takes place, the reserve fuel tanks have been jettisoned. As soon as enough breaches have been made through the obstacles (often with the aid of infantry) the tank company will deploy. This will be done as late as possible, because it costs time to deploy for action. However as soon as the tank company deploys, we will encounter the following situation: three platoons of three tanks each will operate with some intervals left between them and will try to reach the forward edge of defence as quickly as possible while firing away. The distance between the attacking tanks of the platoons will be some 50-150 meters. The total width of an attacking tank company can vary from 500-750 meters. In case the opponents in the defence prove too formidable, the battalion commander can decide to use the reserve of his tank battalion in the sector of this company, by which the number of tanks in the attack can be expanded with up to 10 tanks (NB: this should be 13 in case of tank companies belonging to the armoured battalion of a mechanised infantry regiment, as noted by the author at the start of the article). Prior to the attack on the forward edge of the defence there will be a long preparatory bombardment, which may last up to 30 minutes or more. It is also possible to call on the support of attack helicopters. Because this requires additional preparations and observation of targets and because some time will pass before any actual helicopter support can be provided, it ought to be clear that this will not always be the case. A good camouflaged defence, in addition to good firing positions and firing discipline will make life very difficult for the Russian commander.

Chain of command and communications

The company commander has the use of an HF radio, with which he is in communication with the battalion and the other companies. For communications within the company and any mechanised infantry placed under his command he can use a VHF radio. Many signals are communicated with flags and hand signals, because only the commander may use the radio during combat. Prior to joining combat radio silence is maintained.

Weaknesses

Some weaknesses can be identified in the Soviet tank company and its manner of operating. The command system is so strictly structured, that when the commander is removed it will be very difficult to lead the attacking company correctly for command cannot be assumed by anyone else. There are serious limitations to the use of radio communications as well. Before the unit is operating in an organised manner again, they are likely to have lost valuable minutes. The schnorkel kit seems like a wonderful solution, but it comes with drawbacks. As soon as a tank is ready for schnorkeling, it is most vulnerable. The turret cannot move due to the sealings and the barrel is covered by a rubber cover. The main problem however may be resupply. Within the company there are hardly any or no spare supplies (fuel, ammunition etc) available and at battalion level only very limited ones. The longer a tank unit is fixed by fire the more vulnerable such a unit becomes, as resupply under combat conditions is very difficult to perform, especially if the required means (armoured supply vehicles) are lacking at lower organisation levels."

Regards,

OPFOR doctrine recognizes three basic forms of offensive operation:
meeting engagements, breakthrough attacks, and pursuits. Meeting
engagements are defined as encounters with the enemy in which both
forces begin the engagement on the move. Movement to Contact is the
Western counterpart of this mission profile. Breakthrough attacks are the
equivalent of the Western Deliberate Attack. The objective is to confront and
overwhelm a well entrenched defender, so that follow-up units can exploit
the breach created by the attack and carry the offensive into the enemy’s
rear area. Pursuits are attacks against an enemy that is attempting to
withdraw and regroup his forces. Regardless of which type of offensive
operation is being conducted, however, OPFOR units will employ very
similar schemes of movement while traveling—schemes that you can exploit
to advantage.

The third company is not a reserve in the Western sense of the term. All
of the units in the echelon are committed to the attack. The spacing simply
dictates the timing of each unit’s arrival in the contested area. By holding
one of the three units back, the OPFOR commander is seeking to create a
breach with the first two that the third can exploit at full combat strength.
The Russian theory of combat has no place for the Western reserve concept.
OPFOR commanders always use second echelon units to reinforce success.

If a commander had three units under his command, one making slight
headway against tough resistance, one making no headway, and one being
pushed back by a counterattack—and all calling for help—how would he
divide his second echelon forces? The answer is simple. The unit advancing
would receive all of the available support. The other two units do not
deserve support, and in his view they would be wrong for asking for it.

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At least every one of our tanks and APCs would have a radio-IIRC, many Soviet mech units only had comms at platoon or  even company level.

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1st!!!


Seriously, you might be interested in these declassified CIA reports on war with Russia:

.

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Those aren't simulatiors.

Get SteelBeasts Professional if you'd like to see armor represented in a more realistic manner:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BPWqCuJp0lU

Most of that stuff is far more modern than the 70's era...

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I believe the Soviets would have used nuclear weapons (at first, tactically) on the battlefield - looong before NATO would have felt backed into the corner enough to release the nukes.  

The Soviets viewed ABC as just another tool in the chest, and would likely have used them as part of their initial assault on the West.

Interesting, I've been debating getting it for years, but the cost and the fact it was modern focused kept me from buying it. So are there guys that have modded 1970's or early 1980's era cold war stuff? Anyone do a mod of the T55-AM (late Czech model) used in the 80's with updated armor and funky but modern FCS.

Realistically to do the 70's they should a 60A1, Leo1A1, T55 of some sort, A actual soviet model T72, and a T64. Also sweet would be a Cheify...

Do they simulate broken tracks and having to fix them

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Yup, thats why I said to take those reports with a huge grain of salt in some cases, some are ok. That view was totally disproven when the various Warpac oplans were "found" after the cold war ended. Every version of the CSLA (czech) plan aside from the 50's version has tactical nuke use featured prominently as part of the plan. Nuke the shit out of the west and march west... The plans are pretty optimistic as well, but I guess if you nuke the fuck out of everything before you step on the gas you don't expect much resistance.

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The Carter era... with our military gutted and a caricature for POTUS, was probably about as scary as it got for the Cold War.  The Soviets just might have have "blunt forced" their way to the Atlantic before we could have stopped them.

Glad I wasn't old enough to start paying attention to this type of stuff until well into the Reagan administration.  I'd have been one neurotic little kid.