Quoted:



The only problem is that none of it went down that way at all.  The movie is based on the book, and the book was ghost written by a sensationalist British military author who sat down with Marcus in one, unrecorded session for the material.

For those of us who spent years in the reconnaissance community, who have heard the details of Marcus's own AAR/debrief post recovery (by Army elements of SOCOM), there is no mention of most of what is written in the book.  For starters, Ahmad Shah never was responsible for the deaths of 20 Marines.  There weren't even 20 Marines KIA in Afghanistan by July, 2005.  There were 9 USMC fatalities as of the commencement of Operation Red Wings in June of 2005, which The Lone Survivor doesn't even correctly name on the book cover.

If you doubt this, here is the list of US fatalities, not even just KIA, but fatalities from accidents as well:  Casualties OEF Afghanistan

Ahmad Shah wasn't even a High Value Target.  He was a Target of Interest that 3/3 Marines had planned to pinpoint with one of their recon teams from the STA Platoon.  Instead, the mission was given to the SEALs, and they planned and executed it horrendously.  They failed before they even got to Afghanistan.  Ahmad Shah had a group consisting of 7 other fighters, 8 total with him.  They were the only ones who ambushed the SEALs after they were compromised.

The compromise of the team was a textbook lesson in how to do the opposite of everything you learn as a Reconnaissance commando, as well as leadership failures all the way up to the CJSOTF.  They didn't have a no-commo plan, they only took 2 commo devices, an MBITR and the SAT Phone, which is an emergency layer that should come after 2 other layers of radios.  They didn't have a mission support site, no commo/terrain mitigation plan, no camouflage/hide site, rigged out for CQB rather than SR, took only 5.56 small arms including SPR's?, emplaced their OP on a ledge surrounded by high ground, with absolutely nowhere to E&E from, and most likely were asleep when the goat herders walked up on them, bells and all on the goats' necks.

It's fairly easy even then to get out of that one, once they were soft compromised.  Send your communicator and another man for security up the mountain to make comms and provide a SITREP, with an immediate request for exfil, while the 2 other men guard the goat herders.  If they had stayed off the stupid goat trails, complete with goat scat, they never would have been caught racked out in the first place.

Even from the perspective of a first-term Recon soldier in an Army Scout Platoon, there are so many things they did wrong before they even got there that are painfully clear to see.  For someone who has spent time in several recon units spanning 10 years, including the leadership and detailed mission planning pieces of the pie, this whole episode makes you ask why they didn't have the proper training to conduct a pretty basic operation.  Unfortunately, it comes as no surprise for those of us who have deployed as part of a CJSOTF, or worked with the SEALs in a professional capacity.

If you really want to get misty eyed, think of the highly sensitive equipment that was recovered by Ahmad Shah and his men:

* Ruggedized laptop with intact hard drive, to include detailed imagery of sensitive US locations in the region that had no business even being on the mission
* MBITR radio
* 3 SOPMOD configured M4A1 carbines with Own The Night accessories, 2 with M203 Grenade Launchers
* Night Vision Devices
* Spotting scope

How many lives were lost, and how much additional effort had to be sacrificed in the recovery?  For starters, the ad hoc QRF and the MH-47 crew were all killed within hours. The equally big picture consequences revolve around that hard drive and the weapons.