Operation RED WINGS  What really happened?
by Ed Darack

Published in the Jan 2011 Marine Corps Gazette

The events of Operation RED WINGS, which spiraled into disaster shortly after the insert of a four-man Naval Special Operations Forces (NavSOF) reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) team during the opening phase of the operation, present war fighters (and those covering military operations) with a broad array of vital contemporary case studies relevant to those functioning at the battalion staff, company, platoon, and squad levels.
These include studies forces and SOF, the paramount necessity of unity of command/effort, communications in complex mountainous terrain, mountain ambush tactics, and the importance of comprehensive, de-tailed planning, among others. Despite these lessons (the knowledge of which will arguably save lives in future operations), little has been discussed in professional military papers about Operation RED WINGS. However, much has been written and discussed about RED WINGS in general media (which is often referenced by war fighters for their ongoing professional military education), and much of this, including the content of two books on the topic, is rife with misinformation.
Background, Key Points, and Aftermath
In November 2004, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (3/3) arrived in Regional Command-East (RC-East), Afghanistan, and assumed responsibility of their area of operations (AO), which included the restive Kunar Province. 3/3's overarching goal was to continue to increase stability in the region with Afghanistan's 18 September 2005 national parliamentary elections on the horizon. 3/3 deployed not as part of a MAGTF but as an infantry battalion to be integrated into a combined joint task force (CJTF). 3/3's staff identified deconfliction issues with SOF units working in the same geographic areas that 3/3's AO covered. However, 3/3's staff also identified force multiplicative opportunities they felt working with SOF would avail to the battalion. 3/3 developed a novel model that allowed for operational integration, deconfliction, and defacto operational control (OPCON) of SOF ground units and SOF support assets not normally available to conventional forces.

One of the culminating achievements of 3/3's tour in RC-East was the forced surrender of a regional high value target anticoalition militia (ACM) leader named Najmudeen, whom conventional and SOF units had sought for years. Subsequent to Najmudeen's surrender, which occurred just after Operation SPURS, 3/3 conducted Operation MAVERICKS and then Operation CELTICS. All three of these operations incorporated SOF in their opening phases. In May and June2005, during the relief in place/transfer of authority with 2/3, 3/3's staff began planning Operation STARS, which was to focus on ACM activity in the Korengal Valley region, to the west of Asadabad, the Kunar's provincial capital Due to a decline in actionable intelligence feed, however, STARS had to be delayed, and ultimately 3/3 handed what at that point was a "shell" of an operation to 2/3.  2/3's staff took the operational shell, renamed it RED WINGS and, through analysis of intelligence, identified a relatively small (less than 20 ACM), little- known cell and its leader, Ahmad Shah, as the focus for RED WINGS. (Shah was attempting to fill the regional ACM power void after Najmudeen's surrender to 3/3.) Shah based his operations high on the slopes of Sawtalo Sar Mountain, which sits between the Korengal Valley and the Shuryek Valley.
The purpose of RED WINGS, in continuance of 3/3's operations, was to disrupt ACM activity (with Shah as the focus) prior to the 18 September 2005 national elections. The Marines planned to have a six man scout/sniper team traverse a series of valleys and ridges under cover of darkness to a group of predetermined observation points high on the slopes of Sawtalo Sar for the opening, or shaping phase, of RED WINGS. Once the scout/sniper team had positively identified Shah and his group, a larger force of Marines was to undertake the direct action phase, while a company sized element of Marines functioned as outer cordon.

For this second phase,
2/3 required assault support capable of low-illumination infiltration/exfiltration. Not having an associated aviation combat element, the 2/3 staff requested support from the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment (Airborne) (160th SOAR(A)) from Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). REDWINGS was similar in design to operations conducted by 3/3, but 2/3 sought the integration of only a SOF aviation support element, not ground forces. The SOTF, which had recently undergone a command change to one less amenable to SOF combined force integration, responded that 2/3 could be granted 160th support but only if SOF ground personnel undertook the opening two phases of RED WINGS and were tasked as the lead supported elements with full OPCON (inclusive of 2/3) for these phases. With no alternatives, the battalion staff agreed. The ground force that agreed to undertake the supported first two phases of RED WINGS was a NavSOF group consisting of an assortment of U.S. Navy SEALs deployed to Afghanistan at that time.

The NavSOF element planned the specifics of these first two phases of RED WINGS with 2/3's staff providing input, including briefing the SEALs with preselected 10-digit grid reference points on the target area for calls for fire from a 105mm artillery battery at Forward Operating Base Wright (outside of Asadabad) and a recommendation to augment the SEAL's communications plan (to carry a more robust, albeit heavier, radio), among other points.

Operation REDWINGS began with an insertion of a four-man NavSOF R&S team near the summit of Sawtalo Sar late in the night on 27 June 2005. As with the specifics of the planning of this phase, 2/3 played no direct role in command and control, as this was the "SOF supported" portion of the operation. The team was inserted by helicopter within 1 mile of a populated area-sparsely populated, but populated nonetheless. Late in the morning on 28 June 2005, unarmed locals soft compromised the team. (Soft compromised means opposing forces have detected you; hard compromised means they're trying to kill you.) Within approximately 1 hour of the compromise, a group of between 8 and 10 of Shah's men (including Ahmad Shah himself ) ambushed the R&S team, utilizing AK-47 fire, PK ((Pulemyot Kalashnikova) designed by the Soviet Union and currently in production in Russia) light machinegun fire, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire, and possibly an 82mm mortar system.

As the R&S team descended into the northeast gulch of Sawtalo Sar (on the Shuryek Valley side of the mountain) under the press of the ambush, Shah's men engaged the team with coordinated plunging, interlocking fires from multiple superior topographic positions. The R&S team attempted to establish communications with their combat operations center via satellite through an AN/PRC-148 radio, which failed, and then attempted communications with an Iridium satellite phone, which failed. Shah's men killed three of the team within 1 hour. Hours later a quick reaction force (QRF) was launched, consisting of members of NavSOF and Marines, in separate aircraft.

2/3's air officer requested that before any aircraft attempted any insert, members of the QRF positively identify member(s) of the R&S team, either visually or by radio. The pilots agreed. No positive identification could be made. Despite this shortfall, aviators of one of two MH-47s of the 160th attempted to insert eight NavSOF personnel near the summit of Sawtalo Sar. During this insert attempt, one of Ahmad Shah's men shot the MH-47 out of the sky with an RPG, killing all 16 personnel onboard.
Shah's men recovered virtually all of the R&S team's gear, including three M4s fitted with M203 40mm grenade launchers, rounds for the M4s and M203s, low-illumination visualization equipment, an intact AN/PRC-148 radio, a sniper spotting scope and, among many other items, a laptop computer with an intact hard drive containing classified material including detailed maps of the U.S. and British Embassies in Kabul. Coalition forces could only presume that Shah would utilize what he and his men recovered from the SEALs in their future attacks against U.S., coalition, and Afghan civilian and government personnel and facilities.

A massive search and recovery effort was launched in the wake of the ambush and subsequent MH-47 shoot down. A local villager who had befriended Marines at Camp Blessing, roughly 8 miles distant, had found and then protected the only survivor of the R&S team; he sent another villager to Blessing with a note from the survivor. As the bodies of the SOF personnel were recovered and the survivor rescued, Shah and his men absconded into Pakistan, where they produced and distributed one of two videos they shot during the ambush for propaganda purposes. While the massive coalition presence during the recovery effort achieved the desired end state of the operation (disruption of ACM activity), this was a short-lived and pyrrhic "victory." Foreign fighters flowed in to join the emboldened Shah due to his overnight infamy. (Media had reported only a few facts of the operation, and the dramatic loss of so many U.S. troops was the lionized focus of this coverage.)

Within weeks Shah's attacks began anew, including an improvised explosive device (IED) strike on a convoy of Marines in late July 2005 and renewed mortar and rocket attacks on both military and civilian targets. RED WINGS was an incredible tragedy for the families, friends, and associates of those lost. From a tactical/ operational standpoint, and from an analysis of its influence on furthering security in the region (the operation's purpose), the opening phase of REDWINGS was an unmitigated monumental disaster-one of the greatest, if not the greatest, in recent military history. Because so many resources were pushed to aid the recovery effort (the search and recovery was called REDWINGS II), other planned operations(not just in that part of the AO but throughout Afghanistan) had to be delayed and many cancelled altogether. Ahmad Shah, a once unknown local Taliban aspirant, gained instant global fame and saw his ranks, finances, and armaments (including those taken from the SEALs) burgeon, enabling him to renew his attacks with greater intensity and frequency.

Marine Corps Ethos, the Media, and the Truth

In the spring of 2005, when I first embedded with 2/3, Maj Robert Scott and Maj Thomas Wood, respectively the executive officer and operations officer of the battalion, discussed how information on military operations is often unfortunately skewed in one form or another. One of their key points was that just as painting a military operation or unit in an unfairly negative light hurts the overall war effort through erosion of public support, exaggeration and omission to deflect responsibility or to "glorify" a unit or event with excessive grandiose aggrandizing will, in the long run, prove just as injurious (if not more so) to the military as a whole. An inaccurate narrative will only erode the public's faith and confidence in the military once the public realizes the extent of that narrative's inaccuracies, especially if the public perceives that the misinformation can be traced to the military itself. Military stories should be told comprehensively and honestly, inclusive of the good, the boring, the bad, the funny, and even the embarrassing. The idea of America having a Marine Corps because the citizenry wants and not needs a Marine Corps falls in line with having the Marine Corps story told accurately.

The Misinformation Trail

Like coverage of most disasters, military or otherwise, media outlets raced to gather any detail of RED WINGS they could uncover. Outside of the helicopter shoot down and American military deaths, however, CJTF-76, the lead military command in Afghanistan at the time and the core of which was comprised of the Army's Southern European Task Force, public affairs released little. Since no media had been embedded with relevant units during RED WINGS, news gatherers could only rely on daily public affairs briefings for their information. Within 2 weeks of the ambush and shoot down, a number of articles attempting to provide in depth coverage of REDWINGS emerged. While correct on certain aspects of the tragedy, such as only one member of the R&S team surviving and the number of SOF personnel killed, nothing was reported on the background, development, and purpose of the operation. Furthermore, basic facts of RED WINGS-even its name (most articles referenced it as REDWING)-were misreported, usually grossly. Media accounts also omitted Marine Corps involvement in the operation's background and design, as well as in the recovery effort of RED WINGS II.

This dissemination of inaccurate information reached a whirlwind pace in June 2007 with the publication of the book, Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10, about the only surviving member of the R&S team.1 While the survivor, Petty Officer2d Class Marcus Luttrell, was given authorship credit, the book was actually written in its entirety by a British writer, Patrick Robinson, who penned primarily military fiction titles. In an article written by Robinson in February 2010, he states that the Navy chose him to be the ghostwriter of Lone Survivor based on his series of novels involving SEALs.  Shortly after Luttrell and Robinson met, just weeks after RED WINGS drew to a close, the two secured a book deal and then a movie deal. Robinson began writing the manuscript as Luttrell returned to active duty. The Navy reviewed and approved the manuscript, endorsing it as accurate. Shortly after REDWINGS, a number of Marines of 2/3 carefully reviewed Luttrell's after-action report (AAR) and the R&S team's gear manifest to learn of any recent changes in enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures and, more importantly to ascertain what additional threats they might face during operations and patrols due to Shah acquiring the SEAL team's gear. In the AAR Luttrell stated that the team was attacked by 20 to 35 ACM. (Analysis of 2 videos made by Shah, as well as other intelligence, indicated 8 to 10 total, a common ACM team size for this area.) Twenty was the number initially released by CJTF-76 public affairs. In Lone Survivor, however (which was released the same week Luttrell retired from the Navy), Robinson writes that the team faced hundreds and that Ahmad Shah was one of the top lieutenants to Osama bin Laden. During the battle, according to Lone Survivor, the SEALs killed dozens of "Taliban." Robinson does not discuss Marine involvement in RED WINGS in Lone Survivor, or the prior operations after which REDWINGS was based, or the purpose of the operation, or the development of the operation, or any of the command relationships during REDWINGS. The (very gripping, yet extraordinarily unrealistic) narrative of a small special operations team inserted on a lonely mountain to not just surveil, but to take down the operations of one of Osama bin Laden's top men-who had hundreds of fighters with him-continued to propagate throughout the media.  

Roughly 3 years after the release of Lone Survivor, another book covering RED WINGS was released. Published by a prominent military publisher, this book focuses on the commander of the R&S team, LT Michael Murphy, USN. Although highlighting Murphy the individual, the book nevertheless provides a narrative of RED WINGS, a narrative again riddled with misinformation. The author explained, based presumably on information from his sources, the precipitating event and the genesis of operation REDWINGS:

On June 3, 2005, Shah's forces ambushed and killed three Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne) near Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-E, located outside the town of Orgune in the Paktika province in southwestern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. Killed were Captain Charles D. Robinson and Staff Sergeant Leroy E. Alexander. Seriously burned was Staff Sergeant Christopher N. Piper, who subsequently died of his wounds. The Marines approached CJSOTF-A's commanders and requested the capture or elimination of Shah.

While Paktika Province lies in eastern Afghanistan (not southwestern Afghanistan as the author states), no Marines operated in Paktika at any time near the planning or execution of RED WINGS. Of course, there is no such unit in the whole of the Marine Corps as "Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne)."
Robinson, Alexander, and Piper were all members of 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, which fell under the command of CJSOTFA while in Afghanistan. The Marines never approached CJSOTF-A's commanders to request anything but the low-illumination assault support capability of the 160th SOAR(A); what they received in return was a mandate, rooted in strict adherence to U.S. Special Operations Command doctrine, to integrate SOF ground forces for the opening two phases of the operation and to designate those forces as the supported lead component of RED WINGS if 2/3 was to receive 160th support.

Conclusion
The full story of Operation RED WINGS yields invaluable information for war fighters of all Services as well as civilian journalists covering military operations. An accurate, comprehensive account of the planning; the AO; the enemy; NavSOF involvement; execution; breakdown of command, control, and communications; all that went awry on Sawtalo Sar; and the aftermath provides volumes in lessons learned. But if public affairs officials, authors, reporters, and editors, either through gross incompetence or by intentionally chipping the story into a custom-honed narrative-regardless of how noble they believe their motives may be-allow these lessons to be drowned in a morass of misinformation, then they are lessons doomed to be learned again and again. The sentiments Majs Scott and Wood articulated to me in 2005 remain relevant and vital now more than ever. A healthy democracy with a civilian controlled military requires a high level of transparency of the military. This is an important concept deeply rooted in the Marine Corps' culture of fidelity to the Nation's citizenry. The many Marines I've worked with over the years on media projects continue to not just preach it, they also prove it. It's one of the reasons why so many of us civilians continue to want a Marine Corps.

Notes
1. Robinson, Patrick (based on interviews with Marcus Luttrell), Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10, Little, Brown, New York, 2007.
2. Robinson, Patrick, "Writing Lone Survivor: The Honor and the Anguish," The Huffington Post, 1 February 2010. This article may be accessed at www.huffingtonpost.com/Patrickrobinson/emlone-surviroem-the-sto_b_444843
.html.
3. Williams, Gary, Seal of Honor: Operation Red Wings and the Life of LT. Michael P. Murphy, USN, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2010.
Author's Note: The following officers (with rank at the time) were interviewed in writing this article: Bartels, 1stLt Matt (Commander, Camp Blessing, 2/3).
Cooling, LtCol Norman L. (Commanding Officer (CO), 3/3).
Donnellan, LtCol James E. (CO, 2/3(preselected before 2/3's Afghanistan deployment to relieve LtCol MacMannis after 30 days in country)).
Kinser, 1stLt Patrick E. (Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, Company E, 2/3).
Long, 1stLt Robert (Assistant Operations Officer/Sniper Platoon Commander,2/3).
MacMannis, LtCol Andrew R. (CO, 2/3).
Naval Special Warfare Public Affairs-no response.
Priddy, Maj Andrew (Operations Officer, 3/3).
Ratkowiak, Capt Casmer (Air Officer, 2/3).
Scott, Maj Robert R. (Executive Officer, 2/3).
Turner, 2dLt Regan (Platoon Commander, 2d Platoon, Weapons Company, 2/3).
Westerfield, Maj Scott (Intelligence Officer,2/3).
Wood, Maj Thomas D. (Operations Officer).

Oh man. Note to self: Read post first. I thought you were talking about the other "Red Wings".  

Wow I thought this was going to be about something complete different.

Yeah, I thought he was talking about the other, other Red wings

Too many words

Cliff notes?  I just finished Lone Survivor last night, I don't feel like reading another book on it just yet.

The Cliffs Notes is that the book Lone Survivor is VERY loosely based on the actual events that occurred.





 

I'd say! 8 - 10 Taliban stomp the shit out of 4 SEALS?  

Me too.

Red WING

Red WING

When did the name magically change to Red WINGS?!

yeah that was undertaken by me after a six pack and an unknown number of rum and cokes.



 

I'm too lazy to read all that

It was always Red Wings, and that is part of what the writer refers to as the vast amount of misinformation about the Operation out there.

Yeah just red the whole thing.

I don't know what to make of it.

Big red reporting in?

Posted Via AR15.Com Mobile

Misleading thread topic is misleading

oh and red fox, standing by

Sounds like they were ambushed by a group that used their support weapons how they are supposed to be.

The people saying it is too long you should really read it.

Very interesting article.  Thank you for sharing.

You don't want to believe that a poorly constructed, trained and equipped group of 8-10 men were responsible for the deaths of 19 of the best trained servicemen around.  





It's not the first time I've heard that the book was incorrect in several aspects; hell, it read too much like fiction during some parts.  I did not know about the authorship as indicated in this article, I just assumed that the second author was really the second author.  The article does make one thing clear though - the misrepresentation of events is damaging for both parties (i.e. armed forces and general public), and they are correct I feel.





 

So Did Marcus Luttrell lie or was he confused by the actions of the day?

I think I saw the propaganda video on this. They have the Seals I.d card and equipment.

From above:







 

Of course it was embellished in some ways... stories always are... BUT...

No, I don't want to take one article from one author to be the complete be all and end all.

Does a disservice to all parties involved.

ETA: Cute, of course the author (Ed Darack) has a book of his own to peddle.... So the guy is a author and has such high level knowledge of the event? Oooooook.... This is looking more like opinion to me...

Tag for non cell phone reading.

OK I read that part, but I have seen him (Marcus Luttrell) discuss the book as though it was fact.. So is he purposely deceiving us or is expressing what his memory of the event are..

at inception.
the ops were named after hockey teams, or so the last book I read stated.

son of a bitch.

Tag this one to see how it all shakes out.

 

The book I read was :Seal of Honor: Operation Red Wings and the Life of LT. Michael P. Murphy, USN ,
It's written by Gary Williams, a professor whose class I was very fortunate to take (before he went off on his worldwide book tour). Helluva guy, and a real patriot.
It is more of a life and times of Lt. Murphy, a real interesting account of the SEALs and their training, a bit about actions in Iraq and Afghan, and the process of awarding Lt. Murphy the MOH.

Thats what I was going to say.



ETA: Nvermind.

He's claiming the name was changed....

ETA: Don't buy it. Take it with a grain of salt. Reads too much of someone with an opinion or bias then fact (Like I said above the guy has a book of his own to sell).

You guys need to understand that Luttrell was THE ONLY surviving member of his team and that means that we will probably never really know the exact events as they tragically transpired for those operators.  The biggest WTF moment I had with the book was when they were compromised by the Afghan herders and simply let them go, as it was told.  What kind of SOF recon element goes into combat without fucking wrist-restraints?  At the very least, I would have cut some webbing or para-cord off my gear to bind those fuckers' hands and feet!  A weapon sling - ANYTHING to keep them from just walking away with the whereabouts of my team freshly in their minds.  I know some of my fellow ARFcommers may accuse me of quarterbacking the operation safely within the confines of my home, but it just did not make sense to me when I read that part of the book.

I also remember reading in a related Red Wings thread that several ARFcommers who've spent time downrange claimed the SEALs they saw and/or worked with didn't really have their shit together unlike other SOF operators.  With that in mind, I believe I once heard that Lt. Murphy had been involved in a friendly-fire incident during a live-fire training exercise shortly before undertaking Operation Red Wings.  Can anybody confirm or elaborate on any of that?

Again, I'm by no means claiming to be an expert on these matters, nor am I seeking to smear the reputations of such brave men as these operators were.  I just want to learn.

RIP to those lost in Operation Red Wings.

OP:  Due to increasing lawsuits from content owners - ARFCOM is trying to get posters to post a small part of a published article with a link to the rest at the media of origin.

It has happened before. Once with a SF team in Iraq in the first Iraq war. Can't recall exact facts.

Second, they were goat herders. The goats follow or go to the commands of the herders. Arrest them and leave them there? Sure, the goats stay too.

When the goats aren't where they should be at x time or herders don't return - people come looking for them. Simple as that.

When was it ever operation Red Wing?  The series of operations were named after American sports teams...





 

But how much time could that have given them as opposed to just letting them waltz off, straight to Shah with fresh intel?  I must admit that it's been a few years since I finished the book.

Yup.  Unfortunately, SEALs aren't superhuman and a well executed ambush is as well excecuted ambush.

 

Posted by a SEAL on another forum.  Eye opening...

....... Marcus Luttrell's book omits some very significant events entirely and inserts events or issues which never happened. I suppose Marcus has his own reasons for saying what he says, and he alone will carry the burden for telling the story in the way in which he chose. I saw a very different reality in the wake of that disasterous mission and I will not follow the "company line" on this one when there is this much at stake. Every contributing factor that led to this horrible mission exists in the Teams today because it has not been honestly assessed and had the lessons learned promulgated throughout the SEAL community. Instead, the Navy threw medals at it. Not one person has been reprimanded for their negligence or lack of leadership (possibly because some of them are dead). Many people failed to properly plan and execute that mission, but no single person is more responsible than LT Michael Murphy.

When I think of Medal of Honor recipients I think of Tom Norris, Mike Thornton, Gary Gordon, Randy Shughart, Sammy Davis...etc. Mike Murphy falls far short of that crowd and the Teams lessen themselves by making him out to be someone of that ilk. Murphy is actually almost a polar opposite, in my mind.

Marcus will have to tell the story version he chose over and over again for the rest of his life. I am not inclined to support his detailed account when I saw too much to contradict that. It's easier to remove specific details which are classified than to recall a fable. What exactly remains classified about that mission anyway?


In the end, maybe the truth will surface anyway. No one will care because the Medals are all handed out....probably some other young frogmen will be dead because they didn't benefit from the lessons learned, too.

Frogman

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Originally Posted by Frogman
Well, the Teams are definately evolving...into what I am not certain.

LT Murphy will be the first SEAL to receive the Medal Of Honor for being primarily responsible for killing himself and 10 other SEALs and 8 160th SOAR operators. The mission he designed for himself was not accomplished. Maybe one family feels better because medals got thrown at this mess, but a lot of other families are not pleased. In my opinion the SEAL Teams are diminished when we elevate someone who died tragically (though they, themselves, are mostly to blame) to a status they did not rate in life.

I don't think we should name buildings after people who were killed by their own negligence, either, no matter how much we liked them personally. I know he was well liked by many SEALs. He also shot one of his own men in training. We use to move men who shot another SEAL out of the Team, at least for a while. The reason why was that those types of incidents usually indicated a lack of maturity and reasoning skills. He continued on and contrbuted to the greatest loss of life in a single day in SEAL Team history.

Maybe his picture should be on the wall of every SEAL Team quarterdeck...but not in the same display area as SEAL MOH winners, Kerry, Norris and Thornton.

I sat at the graves of Mike McGreevy and Jeff Lucas in Arlington two weeks ago and communicated. They died on the helicopter coming to rescue Murphy's bunch. They (nor, I for that matter) didn't have to like him or agree with him tactically to get on that helo and risk every tomorrow. That's just what you do in that situation. Both of those guys were better operators than Murphy, in my opnion.

Frogman

You do know that the goat herder stories don't always mean they actually encountered goat herders right?  It also means the team f**ked up and did something to reveal their position and expose themselves.  At least that's what I've been told by some HSLD types.





 

Plenty of times it has been called Red Wing officially and plenty of memorials made with the name "Red Wing". Even Official Memorials.

This is the first I've ever heard it called "Red Wings".

Could be called either or - doesn't matter and doesn't lend any more credence to this particular story.

ETA (Again): Maybe it was Red Wing on the Navy side and Red Wings on the Marine side?

Of course it could - I'm not saying one side or the other is 100% truthful. That's my point. To give belief to the story above posted by an author with a book about the same story (who probably really has no high level knowledge of the event) just seems odd...

No.

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=54343

Jesus Christ.  I'm not even sure what to say which is a good thing since I guess I have no business saying anything.

 

Ok then, explain this:
http://www.navy.mil/moh/mpmurphy/pg.html

And this:
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=33037

And this:
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=32528

And all the other official stories and monuments built....

I'm just saying - who cares about the specific name - doesn't change the story. It's a name. Having an S or not on the end doesn't change a thing.

we all did

You do.

i knew what it was about as soon as i read the heading.

My own personal Operation Red Wings was a success. It wasn't that hard to achieve, just a little gross.