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What happened to "my airplane"?

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Rumor I heard was that she was offered a million dollar severance in lieu of termination and rejected it because she did nothing wrong.

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Things will not get better.

When the people hiring pilots are not pilots and don't know their ass from a shotgun barrel about flying airplanes and the actual pilot skills are not as important as how well you interview or how many politically correct squares you fill, this shit is just part of the price of doing business.

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Things will not get better.

When the people hiring pilots are not pilots and don't know their ass from a shotgun barrel about flying airplanes and the actual pilot skills are not as important as how well you interview or how many politically correct squares you fill, this shit is just part of the price of doing business.

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Looks like a bit more than a "hard landing".

https://i5.swiftpic.io/6DccvrzsXs5b4zkiNEU7p9SZ02E=/970x545//ata/img/524cc0fd58cc7.jpg

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I read it and it doesn't say anything about gender, sexual preference or which bathroom the Captain uses.

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Things will not get better.

When the people hiring pilots are not pilots and don't know their ass from a shotgun barrel about flying airplanes and the actual pilot skills are not as important as how well you interview or how many politically correct squares you fill, this shit is just part of the price of doing business.

Quoted:
Things will not get better.

When the people hiring pilots are not pilots and don't know their ass from a shotgun barrel about flying airplanes and the actual pilot skills are not as important as how well you interview or how many politically correct squares you fill, this shit is just part of the price of doing business.

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The general rule of jumpseater etiquette is not to voice your opinion unless directly asked or you're going to die. I think the JSer thought he was going to die.

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https://youtu.be/ClGuVvxv5es

https://youtu.be/bwYmMG61VDk

Looks like no flare

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https://youtu.be/ClGuVvxv5es

https://youtu.be/bwYmMG61VDk

Looks like no flare

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Unless there's an obviuos need to evacuate,  smoke, fire, water filling the cabin..., the flight attendants shouldn't initiate an evacuation on their own.

The remain seated announcement is pretty much airline SOP in this situation.   Emergency evacuations are almost guaranteed to cause injuries to passengers where as an expedited or more organized deplanning is much safer.   The pilots are the ones that should make the determination on how and when.   And it would fall on the captain to do that,  unless they can't.

In hindsight it's easy to say there was no need for an emergency evac in this situation.

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Bottom line is professional pilots should be able to do pilot shit.

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Unless there's an obviuos need to evacuate,  smoke, fire, water filling the cabin..., the flight attendants shouldn't initiate an evacuation on their own.



The remain seated announcement is pretty much airline SOP in this situation.   Emergency evacuations are almost guaranteed to cause injuries to passengers where as an expedited or more organized deplanning is much safer.   The pilots are the ones that should make the determination on how and when.   And it would fall on the captain to do that,  unless they can't.



In hindsight it's easy to say there was no need for an emergency evac in this situation.

On July 22, 2013, about 1744 eastern daylight time (EDT), a Boeing 737-700, N753SW, operated as Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 345, had a nose gear collapse during a hard landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), Flushing, Queens, New York. Of the 144 passengers and 5 crewmembers on board, 8 sustained minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Nashville International Airport (BNA), Nashville, Tennessee, about 1433 central daylight time. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.

The first officer was the pilot flying (PF) for the trip to LGA, and a pilot from another airline occupied the cockpit jumpseat. The captain stated during postaccident interviews that the majority of the flight from BNA to LGA was normal. However, because of some significant weather conditions in the arrival area, they were given radar vectors around thunderstorm activity and were also instructed to enter a holding pattern at the beginning of the arrival. During the descent, they mostly had a tailwind and there was some rain on the approach. As the PF, the first officer briefed the approach; data from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicate that he agreed with the captain when she suggested a 40º flap setting for the approach. The first officer stated during postaccident interviews that he referenced the weather and planned a visual approach to runway 4, with a runway 4 instrument landing system (ILS) backup. The automated terminal information service (ATIS) at LGA reported clear visibility at the airport and 10- or 11-knot easterly surface wind. However, the captain later stated that, on approach, the tailwind reached as high as about 30 knots.

On the approach, the flight crew configured the airplane for landing and switched communications to the LGA tower, and the tower controller cleared the flight to land. The first officer said that when they reached the final approach fix, the airplane was configured with the gear down and the flaps set at 30º. The captain stated during postaccident interviews that, some distance past the final approach fix, the pitch attitude did not look right to her and she noticed that the flaps were set to 30º instead of 40º, which the performance calculations for landing were based on. CVR data indicate that at 1743:30, the captain said "oh we're forty," and the first officer responded, "oh there you go." Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) indicate that the captain set the flaps to 40º as the airplane was descending through about 500 ft radio altitude. CVR data show that she made the 500 ft callout about 13 seconds later.

The first officer stated that the autopilot was coupled to the ILS, the autothrottles were engaged during the approach, and the sink rate was about 700-800 ft per minute. Around 500 ft, he cross-checked the wind and recalled that there was a slight crosswind of around 11 knots. FDR data show that the autopilot was disconnected at 1743:50, when the airplane was somewhere between 385 and 361 ft radio altitude, and that the first officer was actively manipulating the flight controls after the autopilot was disengaged. The first officer stated that he began to transition to a side-slip maneuver for the crosswind by lowering the right wing and compensating with left rudder to align the airplane with the runway.

The first officer stated that the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) indicated two red and two white lights and that he was satisfied with the airspeed and crosswind corrections. He said he used the PAPI as his primary approach path reference but also cross-checked the ILS glideslope indicator. He said the airspeed fluctuated between Vref and Vtarget but was generally closer to the Vtarget speed. He recalled that there was about an 8-knot difference between the two speeds. FDR data indicate that the airplane was above glideslope about this time at 100 to 200 ft, reaching a maximum recorded deviation at 1744:23 just before touchdown.

The first officer stated that, as they crossed over the runway overrun area, he noticed that the PAPI indicated three white lights and one red, indicating that they were a little high on the glidepath. He knew that he would need to make a slight correction to land in the touchdown zone. The captain stated that she was looking through the heads up display (HUD) during the approach and was able to see the wind display on the HUD. When over the threshold, she thought the airplane was "groundspeed fast," the pitch was too low, and that they were not getting the right sink rate to the ground. She said she believed that if she did not act, the airplane would have continued to float past the touchdown zone. CVR data indicate that at 1744:14, she made the 100 ft callout then said "get down get down get down" about 3 seconds later. At 1744:23, the captain said "I got it," and the first officer responded "okay you got it." The airplane was about 27 ft radio altitude at this time. FDR data show that at 1744:36, the throttle resolver angles for both engines decreased to about 35º and that the recorded N1 values for both engines also decreased.

The first officer stated that after giving the captain control of the airplane, he scanned the altimeter and airspeed, but his visual focus was drawn outside the cockpit because of the rapidly approaching runway. The captain said that she was not certain what the pitch attitude was when she took control of the airplane but knew that it was not what it should have been for a 40º flaps landing, which she thought should have been around 5º. FDR data show that, shortly before engine power was reduced, the aircraft's pitch began to enter a negative (nose down) trend that continued to decrease to a minimum airborne value of -3.87º.

The captain reported that she increased back pressure on the controls to raise the nose and was increasing power as the airplane dropped to the runway. FDR data show that, just before touchdown, control column position for the captain and first officer remained near zero and that the throttles were advanced about 1 second before touchdown. The captain said that she saw the nose hit the runway and felt the impact, which she said was hard. The first officer also said that the airplane hit hard and that it felt like they landed nose first. He did not recall if they bounced. The airplane started sliding and veered slightly to the right before stopping on the right side of the runway centerline about 2,500 ft from its initial touchdown.