Docket No. 106367.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
MICHAEL DIGGINS, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 8, 2009.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,
Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
Section 24–1.6(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that
a person is not guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon if that
weapon is "unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box,
shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a
currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card.” 720 ILCS
5/24–1.6(c)(iii) (West 2006). In the case at bar, we are asked to
determine whether the center console of a vehicle is a "case” within
the meaning of this provision. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that it is.
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Background
Following a jury trial in Peoria County, defendant Michael Diggins
was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in violation of
section 24–1.6(a)(1) of the Criminal Code. Evidence presented at trial
revealed the following.
Sergeant Michael Boland testified that on March 24, 2006, he was
on patrol in Peoria, Illinois, with his partner Officer Lane, when he
observed a black Chevrolet Suburban make a right turn without
signaling. Boland directed the car, driven by defendant, to pull over.
After defendant stopped, Boland asked defendant for his driver’s
license and proof of insurance. Defendant retrieved his insurance card
from the glove compartment and handed it to Boland. When Boland
again asked defendant for his driver’s license, defendant replied that
he had a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card (FOID) card. Boland
then asked defendant if he had any guns in the vehicle, and defendant
responded, "Yes, I do.” Defendant pointed to the center console of his
vehicle and said they were "in there.” Boland testified that he told
defendant not to reach into the console and then he and Lane
handcuffed defendant and defendant’s passenger and removed them
from the vehicle. Boland then entered the vehicle.
According to Boland, the lid to the center console was ajar,
although there was a key in the console’s lock. When Boland opened
the lid, he observed two unloaded handguns: a .45-caliber
semiautomatic black pistol and a chrome .357 Magnum revolver. He
also observed a magazine loaded with eight .45-caliber rounds and six
rounds of .357 ammunition. A duffel bag, located in the rear
compartment area of the vehicle, contained two boxes with 42 rounds
of .45-caliber ammunition and 46 rounds of .357-caliber ammunition.
Boland testified that he did not remove the guns at that time, but
waited for other officers to arrive to take photographs. After
photographs were taken, Boland removed the guns from the console
and found defendant’s wallet, which contained his driver’s license and
FOID card.
Defendant testified that the console was closed and locked when
Sergeant Boland executed the traffic stop. According to defendant,
when Boland asked him for his license, he went to the console to
retrieve it, but the console was locked. Defendant asked his passenger
to get the console keys from the glove compartment. His passenger
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got the keys and gave them to defendant. Defendant then unlocked the
console, pushed the button, and raised the lid. At that time, defendant
told Boland he had a FOID card and driver’s license, which were in
his wallet in the console, but that he was not going to reach into the
console because he had guns in there. According to defendant, he put
his hand in the air, at which time Boland grabbed it, pulled it out the
window, and handcuffed him. Defendant testified that, when he was
pulled over, he was about to drive back to Florida, and that he carried
his guns in the console when traveling because the highway was
"dangerous.”
Defendant’s passenger, Willie Moore, also testified. He confirmed
that defendant asked him for the keys to the console, that he retrieved
them from the glove compartment and gave them to defendant, and
that defendant then unlocked the console. After defendant unlocked
the console, Moore said, defendant advised Boland he had guns in the
console.
At the close of the evidence, defense counsel sought a jury
instruction, based on section 24–1.6(c)(iii), that a person is not guilty
of aggravated unlawful use of weapons if the weapons are enclosed in
a "case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container” by a
person who has been issued a currently valid FOID card. The trial
judge refused the instruction.
The trial judge also prohibited defendant from asserting, in closing
argument, that the console was a "case” or "other container” under
section 24–1.6(c)(iii). However, the State was allowed to argue that
the console was not a "case.”
During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge,
asking, "What is the legal definition of a case?” Over defense
objection, the trial judge instructed the jury that the console was not
a "case” under Illinois law. Shortly thereafter, the jury returned its
verdict, finding defendant guilty of aggravated unlawful use of
weapons. The court sentenced defendant to 30 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new
trial, finding that the center console of a vehicle is a "case” within the
meaning of section 24–1.6(c)(iii). 379 Ill. App. 3d 994. In so holding,
the appellate court rejected the finding in People v. Cameron, 336 Ill.
App. 3d 548 (2003), that a glove compartment was not a "case” or
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"other container” because it was not portable. The court below
determined there is nothing in the plain language of any of the terms
in section 24–1.6(c)(iii), whether considered separately or together,
to indicate the legislature intended for the exception to apply only to
portable receptacles. Relying on a standard dictionary, the appellate
court defined the term "case” as "a box or receptacle to contain or
hold something” that "completely encloses the weapon.” Based on this
definition, the appellate court held that the center console was a
"case” within the meaning of section 24–1.6.
We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill. 2d R. 315). We also granted leave
to the Illinois State Rifle Association (ISRA) to file an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of defendant.
Analysis
The statutory provision at issue, aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon, provides in pertinent part:
"(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful
use of a weapon when he or she knowingly:
(1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any
vehicle or concealed on or about his or her person except
when on his or her land or in his or her abode or fixed
place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or
other firearm; [and]
***
(3) One of the following factors is present:
(A) the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded and
immediately accessible at the time of the offense; or
(B) the firearm possessed was uncased, unloaded
and the ammunition for the weapon was immediately
accessible at the time of the offense[.]
* * *
(c) This section does not apply to or affect the
transportation or possession of weapons that:
* * *
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(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying
box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has
been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification
Card.” 720 ILCS 5/24–1.6 (West 2006).
The legislature did not define the word "case” as used in section
24–1.6(c)(iii) and this appeal turns on the proper interpretation of that
term. We review this question of law de novo. Kankakee County
Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 226 Ill. 2d 36, 51
(2007).
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the legislature. King v. First Capital
Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005). The best indicator
of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute, which must be
accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. King, 215 Ill. 2d at 26. "We
construe statutes as a whole, so that no part is rendered meaningless
or superfluous.” People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 581 (2006). Where
the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, this court will
apply the statute as written without resort to aids of statutory
construction. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d 428, 433 (2006).
Because the term "case,” used in section 24–1.6(c)(iii), is not
defined, we assume the legislature intended the term to have its
ordinary and popularly understood meaning. People v. Ward, 215 Ill.
2d 317, 325 (2005). The plain and ordinary definition of "case” is: "a
box or receptacle to contain or hold something (as for carrying,
shipping, or safekeeping).” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 346 (1993). Examples given in the dictionary included "a
silver cigarette [case],” "12 bottles in a [case],” and "a display [case]
in a meat market.” A "box” is defined as: "a rigid typically rectangular
receptacle often with a lid or cover in which something nonliquid is
kept or carried” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 263
(1993)) and a "receptacle” is defined as something that "receives and
contains something” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
1894 (1993)).
In Cameron, the appellate court interpreted the phrase "other
container” within section 24–1.6(c)(iii). The Cameron court found
that not only were a "firearm carrying box” and "shipping box”
portable receptacles, but a "case” was as well. Invoking the doctrine
of ejusdem generis, the court concluded, based on the common
1"Portable” means "capable of being carried : easily or conveniently
transported.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1768 (1993).
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element of portability among the items in section 24–1.6(c)(iii), that
an "other container” must also be portable. Because a glove
compartment is fixed, and not portable, the Cameron court held that
it was not an "other container” within the meaning of section
24–1.6(c)(iii).
We, like the appellate court, find the Cameron court’s analysis
flawed. The Cameron court never attempted to define "case”; it
merely assumed a "case” must be portable. While a firearm carrying
box and shipping box might contain an inherent element of portability,
under its plain and ordinary definition, "case” does not. For example,
a display case in a meat market or elsewhere is not portable in the
commonly understood meaning of portability.1 Accordingly, not all
"cases” are portable. Because there is no common attribute of
portability amongst the terms utilized in section 24–1.6(c)(iii), the
Cameron court’s analysis is incorrect.
The State does not argue that portability is essential to the
definition of "case” or that the doctrine of ejusdem generis applies.
Rather, the State invokes other canons of statutory construction,
primarily, the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. This doctrine provides that
"[t]he meaning of questionable words or phrases in a statute may be
ascertained by reference to the meaning of words or phrases
associated with it.” Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136
Ill. 2d 450, 477 (1990) (Calvo, J., dissenting, joined by Ward and
Clark, JJ.). The State maintains that, under this doctrine, "case” is best
defined as a container specific to a firearm since the other terms in the
statute reference a firearm. The State’s use of this interpretative
principle does not persuade us.
The State’s argument that noscitur a sociis resolves the case at
bar fails for the same reason that ejusdem generis fails. There is
nothing in the language of the statute from which one could conclude
that the legislature intended the terms "shipping box” and "other
container” to be interpreted only in reference to firearms. Thus, there
is nothing in the overall statutory scheme to suggest that the
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legislature intended for the various types of receptacles to be firearm
specific.
Moreover, the term "firearm” does not precede all of the terms or
phrases, i.e., the statute does not read "firearm case, carrying box,
shipping box or other container.” Likewise, the statute does not read
"case, carrying box, shipping box, or other firearm container.” Had
section 24–1.6(c)(iii) been drafted in either of these ways, it might be
reasonable to interpret it to require that all specified types of
receptacles be interpreted only in reference to firearms. Based on the
actual language of the statute, we conclude that the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis simply does not apply here.
The State also argues that if we define "case” broadly to mean any
receptacle which holds something, we would render "firearm carrying
box” and "shipping box” superfluous since these terms would
necessarily fall within the definition of case. However, if we adopted
the State’s argument that all of the terms should be interpreted only
in reference to firearms, the phrase "firearm carrying box” would be
rendered superfluous. Thus, the State’s argument is flawed.
For its final argument, the State relies on the legislative history to
give meaning to the term "case.” However, we need not resort to the
legislature history because we find the plain language of section
24–1.6(c)(iii) unambiguous.
Unpersuaded by the State’s arguments, we conclude that the
legislature used the broad general term "case” unmodified. Giving the
word "case” its plain and ordinary meaning, as we must, permits but
one conclusion: the term "case” in section 24–1.6(c)(iii) includes any
portable or nonportable receptacle and need not be interpreted only in
reference to firearms.
Based on the foregoing, we find, in the case at bar, that the center
console of a vehicle falls within the ordinary definition of case. A
center console is a receptacle that contains or holds something. As
such, we find that defendant’s conduct falls within the exception set
forth in section 24–1.6(c)(iii). In so finding, we note that our result is
controlled by the plain language of section 24–16(c)(iii) as enacted by
the legislature. We are not at liberty to depart from the language
employed. Whether the statute is wise or the best means to achieve
the desired result are matters left to the legislature, not this court.
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Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s conclusion that the trial
court erred in refusing defendant’s proposed jury instruction based on
section 24–1.6(c)(iii) and erred in refusing to permit defendant to
argue in closing argument that the center console was a "case” within
the meaning of section 24–1.6(c)(iii).
Our determination that the center console is a "case” within the
meaning of section 24–1.6(c)(iii) does not end this case. A factual
question remains as to whether the exception is applicable based on
whether the firearms at issue here were "enclosed” in the center
console. For this reason, we remand the matter to the circuit court for
a new trial.
In light of our decision, we must consider whether a new trial
would subject defendant to double jeopardy. See People v. Jones, 175
Ill. 2d 126, 134 (1997); People v. McDonald, 125 Ill. 2d 182, 201
(1988). Officer Boland testified that the console was ajar; defendant
and his passenger testified it was closed. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, it is possible that the jury
could have believed Officer Boland’s testimony over that of defendant
and his passenger. Accordingly, we find there was sufficient evidence
from which the jury could have found defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and, thus, double jeopardy does not preclude a new
trial. See People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265, 279 (1986). However, we
note that nothing in our opinion should be construed as a finding
regarding defendant’s guilt that would be binding upon remand.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the
judgment of the circuit court and remanded the cause for further
proceedings.
Affirmed.